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Abstract 
The energy sector plays an important role in the economic development of 
countries, both developed and developing including Japan. Although the country 
imports 87.6 percent of energy supply (Statistic Bureau, 2013), Japanese 
government relies on energy & electricity companies to manage the business. 
Most firms are private and public corporations, and to a certain extent government 
owned. Given its unique structure and significant roles in the economy, an 
explanatory analysis of energy firms is warranted with Japan as a subject of the 
study. The research aims to identify and describe factors affecting financial 
performance of energy and electricity firms, i.e., petroleum, gas utilities and 
electricity utilities in Japan. 
The research collects the data from S&P Capital IQ, which counts 46 firms 
with 10 years spanning (2001 – 2010). This industry quantitative case study 
utilizes STATA 12 for panel data regression on the impact of internal factors (i.e., 
size, age, location, ownership) on profitability measures (i.e., accounting-based 
measures return on sales, return on equity and return on sales) as well as market-
based measures (i.e., share price, earning per share, and price/earnings ratio). 
The research reveals following results. Regarding the relation between each 
independent variable with dependent factors, the results of the panel data analysis 
can be categorized into three types, the positive factor, the negative factor, and the 
neutral factor. Positive factor is a factor which positively influences two or more 
accounting-based measures. The positive factors are liquidity and size. The 
x 
 
economic situation makes the company with high liquidity enjoy high profitability 
for the short run (Shinada, 2012). Furthermore, size gives advantage the firms 
through (1) economies of scale in operations costing (Majumdar, 1997), (2) larger 
control over external stakeholders (Orlitzky, 2001), and (3) support corporation to 
build various capabilities (Majumdar, 1997 & Orlitzky, 2001). 
Negative factor is factor negatively affects two or more accounting-based 
firm performance. The negative factors are leverage, depreciation and age. The 
detriments of the debt in the form of interest payment and financial distress 
(Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, & Roland, 2011) excess the advantages of the debt. 
Consequently, increasing debt will harm the performance. Although older 
companies enjoy higher revenue, the firms in energy and electricity industry in 
Japan also falls on inertia effects (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010), and corporate 
aging (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010).   
Lastly, the neutral factor is a factor affects one or less following variables: 
return on assets, return on equity, and return on sales. The neutral factors are 
investment, location, and government ownership. The investment successfully 
improves the revenue but failed to increase the firm performance. The trade-off 
between location and price (Rothenberg, 2011) support the neutrality of location. 
Meanwhile, neutral effect of state ownership shows that the government does not 
look for the financial benefit through the state-owned enterprises. 
 
Keywords: Japan, Financial Performance, Analysis, Energy, Electricity 
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
This chapter elaborates the background why this research chooses Japan as 
the subject of the study, specifically the energy and electricity industry, then 
followed by an overview of the problem statement and research objectives. 
Further, the explanation about the significance of research and thesis structure 
closes the introduction section. 
1.1 Background 
Japan is one of the leading economies as well as ranked for the fourth largest 
economies in the world after the United Stated, China, and India  (International 
Comparison Program, 2014). Compared to other three countries, Japan is short on 
natural resources (Takase & Suzuki, 2011) and low in population. Thus, the 
achievement must be supported by high productivity and energy-efficiency 
(Statistic Bureau, 2013). reveal how the energy takes role in the economic growth 
of the countries. They found that there is one way relation from energy 
consumption to income and Gross Domestic Product. It means energy triggers the 
increasing of production and value added in Japan (Soytas & Sari, 2003).  
Understanding how important of energy important role in the economy, the 
government struggles to fulfil the energy needs, and as results Japan imports 87.6 
percent of energy supply, and about half of the supply is converted into electric 
power (Statistic Bureau, 2013). In order to reduce the risk of the price volatility, 
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Japan has taken many actions to secure the energy, from both supply side (i.e. 
diversify energy sources, protection on the supply of petroleum) and demand side 
(i.e. energy conservation). 
As a result, Japan becomes one of the lowest rates of energy use per unit of 
GDP produced among the industrialized nations (Statistic Bureau, 2013). As 
shown in the figure 1.1, the consumption of petroleum declined from 77.4 percent 
in fiscal 1973 to 46.1 percent in fiscal 2011 (Statistic Bureau, 2013).Even though 
it still dominates the energy supply, other sources are significantly increased with 
the latest figure is 21.3 percent (coal), 21.4 percent (natural gas), 4.0 percent 
(nuclear) and 3.3 percent (hydro power) (Statistic Bureau, 2013).  
Although energy is an important sector, Japanese government involves 
private and public firms to manage the business, with government ownership in 
certain companies. The government has major ownership in two petroleum 
companies (i.e. INPEX and JAPEX) which responsible to explore and exploit oil 
and gas in domestic and overseas. While local government possesses minority 
shares of the electricity and gas companies, which responsible for electric and gas 
distribution respectively. In order to protect their concern in the utilities industry, 
the government has conducted tight regulation. Had a unique business structure 
with vital roles, an explanatory investigation of energy and electricity firms in 
Japan is required.  
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(Source: Statistic Bureau, 2013 p. 90) 
Figure 1.1: The trend of Japanese energy supply  
1.2 Problems Statement 
The previous researches of energy in Japan, mostly focus on energy policy, 
productivity and efficiency in order to build the recommendation for the energy 
policy maker, hence the analysis emphasizes on evaluating the current system and 
also regulation. This study is about company level investigation of factors 
affecting financial performance. This energy and electricity company level 
investigation is mainly expected to answer following questions: 
a. What are the factors affecting financial performances of energy and 
electricity firms in Japan? 
b. How do those factors influence the financial performances of energy firms 
in Japan? 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
Conform to the problem statements, this research is aimed to identify, 
describe and explain the factors affecting financial performances of energy and 
electricity firms in Japan. The factors are limited to internal factors. Accordingly, 
the executive in the company has the authority to control and manage the items. 
The causal relationship of the factors to firm performance is tested using statistical 
analysis. 
1.4 Significance of Research 
The research will be beneficial for the scholars, managers, and government. 
In terms of researcher, this study will provide references for the study of energy 
and electricity sector in company-level especially for spanning time 2001-2010. 
The executive within a company can utilize this research for the consideration of 
the corporate strategy-building, compared with the industrial average and the 
effect to firm performance. 
Likewise, Japanese government as the energy policy-maker can use the 
research as consideration in building the energy policy with sustainable result, 
especially from the corporation’s perspective, where the profit-seeking is one of 
the reasons to involve in the industry. While governments in developing countries, 
especially Indonesia, the research is important since the energy system in Japan 
involves the private companies with high efficiency, which is a good model for 
Indonesia.  
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
The structure the thesis is as follows: chapter 2 provides a literature review; 
chapter 3 explains the theoretical analysis and hypotheses. In chapter 4, there is 
discussion about research methodology, and chapter 5 is about data processing 
and the result. Chapter 6 provides discussion and finding, and the last chapter 
explains about the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2.  
Literature Review  
The literature review chapter covers a depth review on energy study in Japan, 
firm performance in Japan, and also global firm performance analysis. Many 
scholars have published the researches about energy and electricity from policy 
and productivity perspectives while studies in company level are rare. Mostly, the 
studies are about how the government manages the limitation upon the natural 
resources as the supply for the energy. Such as electricity deregulation (Asano, 
2004); gas utilities (Matsumoto & Kasahara, 1998); and (Lam, 2000); energy 
policy (Duffield & Woodall, 2011);(Matsumura, 2003);(Nagayama, 2011); (Koike, 
Mogi, & Albedaiwi, 2008), and (Takase & Suzuki, 2011); renewable energy (Moe, 
2012); and(Huenteler, Schmidt, & Kanie, 2012); efficiency and productivity 
(Nemoto, Nakanishi, & Madono, 1993);(Goto & Sueyoshi, 2009) and (Nakano & 
Managi, 2008). 
In firm-level, there are many researches related to financial performance in 
Japan. Mostly, it relates with manufacturing and electronic industry, with the 
study area focuses on the relation of firm performance with the labour union 
(Brunello, 1992), information sharing (Morishima, 1991), environmental issue 
(Cortez & Cudia, 2011)and(Nakamura, 2011), ownership and investment 
behaviour (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto, 2005), technological 
capabilities (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2008) and CEO remuneration (Kato 
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& Kubo, 2006). Investigation about firm performance in energy and electricity 
sector seems unfavourable.  
Since the research about the factors affecting firm performance for Japanese 
firms is limited, the study expands the literature review into global journals. They 
are from Greece (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010); Jordanian (Almajali, Alamro, & 
Al-Soub, 2012); Indonesia (Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi, 2008); Slovenia 
(Hrovatin & Ursic, 2002), Scotland (Glancey, 1998); India (Majumdar, 1997); and 
Croatian (Pervan & Visic, 2012). 
2.1 Energy Studies in Japan 
Since the beginning, Japan realizes that the country does not have sufficient 
energy sources and tries to reduce dependency through managing the supply and 
reducing the demand (Statistic Bureau, 2013). In terms of energy supply per GDP, 
Japan is one of the most-efficient countries in the world (Statistic Bureau, 2013) 
while, from the price perspective, Japan had the most expensive electricity the 
1990s developed countries in 1990s (Asano, 2004). 
Securing the overseas oil and gas supply by private investment is the example 
of the measures taken by the states. Koike, Mogi, & Albedaiwi, (2008) mentions 
four advantages of those actions, i.e. the long-run stability of the petroleum supply 
through the direct participation; precision in market estimation as the results of the 
better understanding of the energy policies of oil producing countries. In addition, 
the understanding of international issues of the oil industry strengthens the 
partnerships, and lastly, to diversify and improve the interdependent relationship 
8 
 
between Japan and petroleum-exporters countries (Koike, Mogi, & Albedaiwi, 
2008). 
However, since the Japan lack of petroleum resources, the private corporation 
does not have enough experience and technologies in the area of exploration and 
exploitation, and this situation increases the risk and investment as well. On the 
effort to overcome the problems, the government invited the private company to 
invest in petroleum exploration through the financial support from Japan National 
Oil Corporation. Later, the institution changed to Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corporation (Koike, Mogi, & Albedaiwi, 2008). In addition, the 
government also involved in the business through two biggest Japan upstream 
companies and owned by the state, JAPEX and INPEX, which spent 3 million 
dollars and 0.4 million dollars in 2006 for R&D respectively. As a comparison, 
ExxonMobil spent 200 million dollars in the same year (Koike, Mogi, & 
Albedaiwi, 2008). 
The Japan efforts to achieve the independent supply from its own companies 
find other obstacles. After the World War II Japanese petroleum and the oil 
industry were horizontally truncated and fragmented with the upstream sector 
(exploration and exploitation) on one side, and the downstream sector (oil refinery, 
wholesales and retails) in the other side. Majority corporations in downstream 
depend on the foreign partners who major player in the petroleum (Matsumura, 
2003)and(Koike, Mogi, & Albedaiwi, 2008). Government’s mean to combine the 
sector through integration industry was failed and result in two incomplete state-
owned companies (Matsumura, 2003). 
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In order to ensure to stable oil supply and equalized the petroleum products in 
the local market, the government opened the importation of petroleum products in 
1996 and allowed the petroleum importers to share the stockpiling obligation in 
1996 as a reserve in emergency situations (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry). 
In the other hand, the electricity sector dominates the energy sector in Japan 
as more than half energy supply is converted into electricity (Statistic Bureau, 
2013). Within the sector, the industry is free from fragmentation. Integration from 
power generation, transmission and power retail give advantages to the private 
companies and result regional monopoly of nine electricity companies 
(Matsumura, 2003). However, the system harms the society and the company 
itself. As the study by Nemoto, Nakanishi & Madono (1993) reveals that the 
utilities companies, except TEPCO, experience dis-economies in the long term 
and most of the companies are significantly over-capitalize (Nemoto, Nakanishi, 
& Madono, 1993). 
In order to overcome the situation, the Japanese government started 
electricity deregulation in 1995. The revision of the Electric Utility Industry Law 
opened the electricity wholesale market, which removes the requirement of 
approval from the MITI for entrance (Matsumoto & Kasahara, 1998). The 
government opens the supply side through a policy of allowing the non-integrated 
electricity to be an independent power producer (Asano, 2004).  
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Further, the action is followed by liberalization for retail competition for the 
large customers with contract over 2 MW, which has 30% of the market in 1999 
(Asano, 2004)&(Nakano & Managi, 2008). As a result, deregulation leads to an 
enhancement in productivity growth, technical change and economies of scale and 
scope (Goto & Sueyoshi, 2009). Moreover, the spike is also found in productivity 
of the steam power generation (Nakano & Managi, 2008).  
Likewise, government reduce the dependent on petroleum by introduces 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG). The policies encourage the use of gas for air-
conditioning and transportation to lower the highest demand of electricity in the 
summer. The action leads the reducing of the capital investment for building 
power plants. As the electricity industry, the gas industry has been managed by 
private firms while the government manages the policies to ensure energy and 
economic efficiencies (Lam, 2000).  
The gas utilities also enjoyed a monopoly as the existing regulation protected 
the industry, though only local and much smaller than of electricity. The gas 
industry consumes only 25% of the LNG, while energy spends the rest. In 
addition, there are 244 gas companies involved within the industry, both small and 
large companies (Matsumura, 2003). The largest companies, Tokyo Gas and 
Osaka Gas, enjoy the national domination and cover about 70% market shares 
(Matsumoto & Kasahara, 1998). Along with electricity, government also conducts 
liberalization in gas utilities. 
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(Source: Osaka Gas, 2012 p. 09) 
Figure 2.1: The deregulation of Japanese gas utilities 
The deregulation was started by amendment of Gas Utility Industry Law in 
1995 by allowing the gas supplier to enter the region outside its service area under 
certain circumstances (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) as shown in 
figure 2.1. 
2.2 Firm Performance Studies in Japan 
Within company level researches, there are many journals related Japanese 
firm performance in manufacturing industry, especially electronic sectors. The 
studies focus on the relation of firm performance with many factors. Those are the 
labour union (Brunello, 1992), information sharing (Morishima, 1991), 
environment (Cortez & Cudia, 2011) and (Nakamura, 2011), ownership and 
investment behaviour (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto, 2005), 
technological capabilities (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2008) and CEO 
remuneration (Kato & Kubo, 2006). Investigation about firm performance in 
energy and electricity sector seems unfavourable.  
Using data of the Yearbook of Japanese Unlisted Companies 1987, Brunello 
(1992) investigates the relationship between labor union and manufacturing firm 
12 
 
performance. The result proposes that Japanese unions significantly lessened 
productivity and profitability, also monthly payroll and bonuses. Strong unions 
decrease the productivity by intervening the management’s decision on the 
employees, including relocations and promotion. The research also finds that 
unionized employees have shorter working hours, which lead to smaller 
productivity. 
In addition, the establishment of the union has led to the lower profitability 
operation. Accordingly, companies pay lower wages for the unionized firms. 
Either the recruiting costs or the rent-sharing explains the relationship between 
lower profitability and lower wages. However, the slight influences are found for 
the smaller firms, suggesting that small-medium size companies were 
subcontractors that have weak bargaining position for the competition and forced 
to cut cost and increase productivity (Brunello, 1992). 
Same study conducted by Morishima (1991), about the relationship between 
manufacturing firm performance and labour, although from the perspective of 
sharing business information with employees. The study uses survey about wage 
negotiation and data about financial performances. The finding suggests a positive 
relation between information sharing with profitability and productivity, and a 
negative relation between information sharing and labour cost. Increases of joint 
consultation committee info improve employee productivity (Morishima, 1991). 
 Another manufacturing firm investigation is performed by Gedajlovic et.al 
(2005). Using three years data (1996-1998), the scholars study how ownership 
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structure affects investment behaviour and financial performance. The types of 
shareholders give various influences on dividend policy, return on assets and 
capital expenditures. Investment trusts and pension fund ownership positively 
affect firm performance. While ownership of pension funds and investment trusts 
have a negative relation with dividend pay-out levels and market risk. Lastly, 
shareholding by financial institutions has positive relationships with dividend and 
accounting profits. While for the relation of ownership with ROA, investment 
trusts, pension funds and financial institutions indicate positive, but affiliated 
firms have a negative association. (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto, 2005). 
The above finding is in line with a study by Mizuno (2010) and Saito (2008). 
First researcher finds that corporate governance has been enhanced by 
institutional investors, even though there is no significant relation between 
institutional investors’ shareholdings and firm performance (Mizuno, 2010). From 
family firm perspectives, the performance of family firms possessed and managed 
by the founder’s descendants is poorer than of non-family firms. In contrast, the 
performance of family firms possessed or managed by the founder’s descendants 
is better than of non-family firms (Saito, 2008). 
In terms of technological capability, study by Isobe et.al (2008) reveals the 
effects of refinement capability (the improvement of the existing asset) and 
reconfiguration capability (integration of new assets) on the small manufacturing 
industry firm performance. Using the mail survey, the scholars find that on 
operational efficiency, the effects of refinement capability is bigger than of 
reconfiguration capability, but on strategic performance the impact of 
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reconfiguration is bigger rather than of refinement (Isobe, Makino, & 
Montgomery, 2008). 
Along with the awareness on global warming, the research on the effect of 
environmental factors on firm performance is also increasing, for example the 
research entitled Sustainability and firm performance: A case study of Japanese 
electronics companies (Cortez & Cudia, 2011) and Does environmental 
investment really contribute to firm performance? An empirical analysis using 
Japanese firms (Nakamura, 2011).  
Nakamura (2011) finds the contribution of environmental investment to firm 
performance. Utilized Japanese listed company data, the findings reveal that the 
environmental investment does not affect firm performance significantly in the 
short term; however, the opposite effect found in the long term, even though the 
effect disappear in the next period. The results propose that there be a time lag 
between investment and firm valuation according to consumers and shareholders 
(Nakamura, 2011). While Cortez & Cudia (2011) focuses the impact of the  
environmental cost into firm performance. Environmental costs positively affect 
the total income generation and vice versa, though the net income and firm size 
are not positively impacted.  
Kato & Kubo (2006) and Kubo & Saito (2008) reports the alternative finding 
of firm performance study. Their investigations are about the relation of CEO 
remuneration and firm performance. Kato & Kubo (2006) disclose that Japanese 
CEO’s payroll is sensitive to accounting based performance. The bonus system is 
15 
 
significantly encouraged CEO to achieve better firm performance and increase 
their take home pay. However, previous finding by Kubo & Saito (2008) explains 
that the performance-based bonus decreased significantly after 1990 (Kubo & 
Saito, 2008). 
2.3 Factors Affecting Firm Performance 
The firm performance studies in Japan mostly relate specific factors. Those 
are the labour union (Brunello, 1992), information sharing (Morishima, 1991), 
environment (Cortez & Cudia, 2011) and (Nakamura, 2011), ownership and 
investment behaviour (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto, 2005), 
technological capabilities (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2008) and CEO 
remuneration (Kato & Kubo, 2006). Since the research of mine focus on the 
internal factors, the literature review are expanded to international libraries, i.e. 
Greece (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010); Jordanian (Almajali, Alamro, & Al-Soub, 
2012); Indonesia (Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi, 2008); Slovenia (Hrovatin & Ursic, 
2002),  Scotland (Glancey, 1998); India (Majumdar, 1997); and Croatian (Pervan 
& Visic, 2012). The results are summarised and provided in Table 2.1. 
Liorgovas & Skandalis (2010) analyze financial performance within the 
Greek industrial firm during 1997-2004. Using the return on sales, return on assets, 
and return on equity in the panel least squared regression with a random effect, 
the author finds that leverage, export activity, location, size and effective 
management substantially affect firm performance in Greece. Moreover, they also 
found that large, young, exporting firms are the characteristic of profitable firms 
(Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010).  
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Same investigation is conducted Almajali, Alamro, & Al-Soub (2012) in the 
Jordanian insurance industry during 2002-2007, covered 25 companies. Utilizing 
T-test and multiple-regression, the researchers find that leverage, liquidity, size, 
and management competence index have positively affected the financial 
performance of Jordanian Insurance Companies (Almajali, Alamro, & Al-Soub, 
2012).  
While from Indonesia, Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi (2008) employs panel data 
of 238 listed companies during 1994 – 2004 to investigate firm performance 
during the 2007 economic crisis. They find that macro factors play more 
significant than firm-specific factor to drive the financial performance, even 
though the firm size has a positive relation to firm profitability but not market 
capitalization. In addition, firms of foreign stockholder have better performance 
than of domestic stockholder in term of return on asset (ROA) and market 
capitalization growth (Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi, 2008).  
In the Scotland, Glancey (1998) conducted the research about profitability in 
38 small manufacturing firms during 1988-1990 to determine the key factors of 
small firm performance. The author finds that smaller firms are more profitable 
but do not grow as fast as larger firms. The profit of the operation reflects a 
security to support the owner’s lifestyle rather than a source of fuel to develop the 
firm. There is an evidence that location support the growth which shown by 
stronger companies lie in urban areas than those lie in remote locations. In 
addition, the result shows that younger firms grow rapider than the older (Glancey, 
1998). 
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The relation between ownership and firm performance are also investigated in 
different countries. Using 488 Slovenian companies, Hrovatin & Ursic (2002) 
examine the effect of insider ownership to the companies’ performance after 
ownership transformation. Their study reveals that insider ownership improved 
firm performance, and performance is negatively influenced export, while 
government ownership insignificantly affects firm performance. (Hrovatin & 
Ursic, 2002). 
Table 2.1:  Summary of factors affecting firm performance 
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On the other hand, in India older firms generate more products though less 
profitable than the younger. This result is one of the findings of Majumdar (1997) 
on the research on the impact of size and age on firm-level performance in India. 
Another finding is that the bigger companies are more profitable but less 
productive than smaller. In the research, Majumdar (1997) employs cross-section 
regression on data of 1020 companies collected for one of the years between 1988 
and 1994. 
From Croatia, Pervan & Visic (2012) investigate the effects of financial 
factors on the firm performance using data of medium and large enterprises within 
2002-2010. The findings show that the firm size positively affects firm 
profitability. Additionally, results showed that asset turnover and debt ratio also 
statistically significantly affects firms’ performance (Pervan & Visic, 2012). 
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Chapter 3.  
Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses Building 
This chapter gives detailed explanations about the theory and literature 
related the hypotheses-building of the research. There are 8 investigated factors in 
relation to firm performance, i.e. leverage, liquidity, depreciation, investment, size, 
age, location, and ownership. Age of the company is started when it is found in 
certain locations, usually close to the customer or resources (Lucky, 2012). 
Establishing a company, the founders required capital in the form of equity from 
the investors, this situation will be represented by ownership, even though over 
time it could be changed by corporate action. 
Another source of capital comes from creditors in the form of debt. Leverage 
is a ratio shows the combination between debt and equity. A manager in the firm 
will utilize the funds, both from creditors and investors, to acquire long-term 
assets and short-term assets and build the size of the company through the 
aggregate of both assets. The assets will represent the size of the company 
(Majumdar, 1997). In this research, current assets will be represented by liquidity 
ratio, while the fixed assets will be measured from investment and depreciation. 
3.1 Leverage and Firm Performance 
The theory of capital structure is initiated by Modigliani and Miller with 
irrelevance theorem in 1958 (Pagano, 2005); (Popescu & Visinescu, 2009); 
(Graham, 2001); (Frydenberg, 2011). Building the irrelevance theorem, 
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Modigliani and Miller made a strict assumption about perfect market. They 
assumed that: no corporate or personal taxes (Pagano, 2005); (Frydenberg, 2011); 
(Graham, 2001), no transaction costs and no bankruptcy costs (Frydenberg, 2011), 
financial perfect market with lenders and borrowers have the same borrowing rate 
and no asymmetric information (Pagano, 2005); (Frydenberg, 2011); (Graham, 
2001).  
As a result, “the value of a company is not affected, by the way, the company 
finances its operations; the value of a company equals the present value of its 
operating cash flows, regardless of whether the firm finances its projects by 
issuing stocks, bonds or some other security” (Graham, 2001), p. 42).  “The 
theorem establishes that a company’s value – the market value of its shares and 
debt – equals the present discounted value of the company’s cash flow, gross of 
interest, where the discount rate is the required return for firms of the same risk 
class” (Pagano, 2005), p. 8). 
The paper headed subsequently to both clarity and controversy and because 
the assumption far from reality (Popescu & Visinescu, 2009). When the 
assumption is relaxed, many theories emerged (Pagano, 2005). The relaxation of 
the tax assumption revealed an optimal capital structure, which requires a larger 
leverage than that observed in reality. Offsetting the tax advantage of debt with 
the costs of bankruptcy will result in optimal leverage; the value increases from 
tax would follow the probability of bankruptcy. The relaxation of asymmetric 
information in financial markets brought the theory of adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard between external financiers and company managers (Pagano, 2005).  
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In terms of leverage, the focus will be a trade-off between the costs against 
the benefits of the use of debt and equity. The advantage of debt is tax-shield, 
where the disadvantage is the financial distress of the debt (Popescu & Visinescu, 
2009).  
 
(Source: Graham, 2001 p. 43) 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the tax-shield benefit of debt  
The tax - shield benefit of tax comes from the nature of debt which is tax-
deductible. The debt will decrease the tax payment and increase net operating 
income to investors (Brigham et.al, 2010). As illustration is shown in figure 3.1, 
with explanation following:  
 Panel A: corporate tax 33.3%, with perpetual cash flow $10 annually, and 
discount rate 10%, equity 100%.  
 Panel B: corporate tax 33.3%, with perpetual cash flow $10 annually, and 
discount rate 10%, equity 60%, bonds 40% with interest rate 10%.  
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When only equity forms the capital, the value of the firm is $100 where 
$33.33 is taxed, and $66.67 is common stock. $100 comes from net present value 
of perpetual cash flow ($10) divided by the discount rate (10%). From the value, 
33.3% is taken by government in the form of taxes (Graham, 2001).  
When utilized 40% bonds; the value of the firm is still in total $100, where 
$20 is the taxes, $20 is the equity and $20 is the bonds. From the perpetual cash 
flow, company pays $4 annually for the interest payment and the taxable income 
remains $6, and the tax is only $2 annually. When the numbers are converted into 
net present value using discount factor 10%, the taxes become $20, interest 
payment is $40, and equity $40. Panel B has $13.33 better than Panel B, and the 
shareholders also collect $40 up-front from bondholders  (Graham, 2001). 
If the debt provides advantages, why company does not maximize it by 
financed entirely using debt? Graham (2001) reports that there are costs to using 
debt, and these costs need to be balanced (or “traded off”) against the tax benefits 
of debt.  
The disadvantages of debt are related to bankruptcy. When a company 
utilizes debt to finance the projects, the interest payment burdens the company in 
fixed rate. The situation is worsening when the profit from the project could not 
cover the interest payment, and the company is exposed to bankruptcy. As 
leverage improved, the costs of the loan become higher and erode the benefits of 
leverage. “Highly-levered firms not only suffer from a debt overhang problem, 
which reduces their incentives to invest in productive investment, their attention is 
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also diverted from productivity improvements by the need to generate cash flow 
in order to service their debts” (Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, & Roland, 2011), p. 2). 
To sum up, there is an optimal leverage ratio, Graham (2001) states “the 
optimal amount of debt varies by firm and each firm should issue debt as long as 
the benefits outweigh the costs, but no more than that.” Leverage of electricity 
and energy sector industry in Japan is unknown. However, there are two 
possibilities, when the leverage is below the optimal ratio, leverage will positively 
affect firm performance (H1a) until it touches the optimal point or leverage of the 
industry above the optimal point so leverage will negatively affect the firm 
performance (H1b). 
Hypothesis 1a: Leverage positively affects firm performance  
Hypothesis 1b: Leverage negatively affects firm performance 
3.2 Liquidity and Firm Performance 
Liquidity means the ability to convert an asset to cash. An asset called liquid 
when it could change into cash quickly without price deteriorated (Brigham, 
Houston, Chiang, Lee, & Arifin, 2010). On the balance sheet, assets are listed in 
order of declining liquidity, meaning that the top is the most liquid asset, and the 
bottom is the most illiquid asset (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). 
In terms of liquidity, assets are divided into 2 types; current assets which 
listed in the top part and fixed assets listed in the bottom part. Current assets 
consist of relatively liquid asset that will be converted to cash within 12 months 
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such as cash and near cash, account receivables, and inventory. Those three items 
of current assets are also called working capital because those assets are utilized 
and substituted all during one year for the operating cycle (Brigham et.al, 2010).  
The amount of the current assets of the companies varies. The nominal of 
current assets can be high or low depend on the size of the company and also 
current assets financing policy. The relaxed policy results high amount of cash, 
inventories and account receivables. While restricted policy will be reflected from 
the constraint on the current assets, and moderate policy lies between both 
policies. The current ratio is one of tools to measure liquidity. Having formula 
current assets divided by current liabilities, current ratio shows the ability of the 
company to pay the coming liabilities within one year using their short term assets 
(Brigham et.al, 2010). 
One of the reasons behind high liquidity is when the company holds much 
cash. John Maynard Keynes asserts three motives for holding the cash, i.e. the 
speculative motive, the precautionary motive, and the transaction motive (Ross, 
Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). 
The speculative motive is the reason where the company wants to take 
advantages of having cash for a better interest rate, supported exchange rate, or 
even for bargain purchases with cash. The precautionary motive is the need of 
holding cash for fund reserve as safety supply and a buffer. Lastly, the transaction 
motive is where holding cash on hand to fulfil the coming payment such as 
monthly bills, rental cost, regular wages, taxes, and interest payment.  
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Even though the e - banking has brought payment transaction in high-speed 
era, there will still be a demand for liquidity and the need to manage it efficiently  
(Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). While in Japan, Shinada (2012) asserts that 
started in 1990’s Japanese corporation accumulate their cash holding because of 
the trend of greater cash flow volatility since the 1990s and the availability of 
cheap financial sources. 
What is the effect of having high liquidity? There is a trade-off between 
liquidity and profitability (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003) (Saleem & Rehman, 
2011) (Wang, 2002). Saleem & Rehman (2011) explain that increasing more of 
one means giving up some of the other. The statement is in line with the findings 
of many studies. 
Large studies about the relationship of liquidity and profitability, using cash 
conversion cycle, find that there is a negative connection between those two 
factors (Saleem & Rehman, 2011), (Raheman & Nasr, 2007), (Mousavi & Jari, 
2012), (Vural, Sokmen, & Setenak, 2012), (Dash & Hanuman, 2009), and (Wang, 
2002). Higher liquidity means holding higher liquid assets. Liquid assets are less 
profitable to hold, for example, cash holdings are the most liquid of all 
investments, but it does not generate any return at all (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 
2003).  
To recap, liquidity and profitability have trade-off principle. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis is liquidity negatively affects firm’s performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Liquidity negatively affects firm performance 
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3.3 Depreciation and Firm Performance 
Proper recording of the purchasing price of long-term assets has implications 
for both the profit and loss statement and the statement of financial position. If the 
acquisition cost is recorded as an expense in the profit and loss statement, the 
balance sheet will be understated because these assets still exist within a year, and 
the profit-loss statement will be overstated because the spending are too high. The 
method to recognize of the spending is called depreciation. 
The value of long-term asset is declining little by little; an adjustment is 
taking place to reduce the book value of fixed assets conformed with the asset’s 
lifetime. Depreciation is an annual charge against income that reflects the 
estimated dollar cost of the capital equipment and other tangible assets that were 
used up in the production process (Brigham, Houston, Chiang, Lee, & Arifin, 
2010).  
While Stice & Stice (2006) define depreciation as the process of allocating 
the cost of assets such as plant and equipment for a period in which the company 
receives the benefits from these assets. The accumulated amount of depreciation 
of an asset is subtracted from the original cost of the asset to reflect the remaining 
cost to be allocated to the expense in the future period. 
Depreciation is taken to the account because the fixed assets are deteriorated 
and obsolete (Stice & Stice, 2006). Physical deterioration because of the assets is 
utilized during the production period and exposed to the air and materials while 
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the obsolescence is the process of becoming outdated when new technology 
appeared or market changed.  
Reichelstein (2007) explains that depreciation charge is one of accrual 
accounting measures which reflect project-specific information (Reichelstein, 
1997). Chambers, Jennings, & Thompson II (1999) adds that depreciation 
potentially contributes to this forward-looking role for earnings by providing 
information about future consumption per-period of fixed asset services 
(Chambers, Jennings, & Thompson II, 1999).  
 
(Source: Showa Shell Seiyu, 2013 p. 90) 
Figure 3.2: Depreciation as expense in the income statement  
Other advantages of depreciation are tax deductible and increasing the cash 
flows. Depreciation expense is conducted in the income statement before the tax 
calculation as shown in figure 3.2. Depreciation reduces the net income before tax 
and lessens the corporate tax in total. The tax is one of the companies’ burdens 
since it should be paid in cash and compulsory.  
Even though depreciation is recorded as an expense in the income statement, 
in the reality company does not spend any money to pay these spending. The 
figure is non-cash transaction which means it does not require any cash payment 
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and become free cash flow in the statement of cash flow as shown in figure 3.3. In 
the reality, the cash outlay took place when the payment of the assets is acquired 
by related party (Stice & Stice, 2006). 
 
(Source: Showa Shell Seiyu, 2013 p. 80) 
Figure 3.3: Depreciation is added back in the statement of cash flow  
How about the effect of depreciation towards firm performance? A ratio used 
to measure firm performance utilized net income as numerator, i.e. return on 
equity, return on assets, and return on sales. The figure of net income is found in 
the profit-loss statement as the result of the revenue decreased by expenses, 
depreciation, and taxes. In this situation, higher depreciation will result in much 
lower net income. Regardless the roles in reducing taxes and providing cash for 
operations, depreciation will lower the net income, so the research postulates that 
depreciation has a negative relation to financial firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Depreciation negatively affects firm performance 
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3.4 Investment and Firm Performance 
In the past, many researchers investigated the relationship of investment with 
firm performances. A group of researcher investigates France, and Italian 
manufacturing industry finds that the investment has shown a further performance 
gain, even though increasing of sales through open new plant is also followed by 
higher levels of employment and decreasing the profitability (Grazzi, Jacoby, & 
Treibich, 2013). While from Swedish found that there are two-ways causality 
relationship between investment and firm performance (Heshmati & Loof, 2008). 
When investment is focused on the information technology, the result is also 
similar; it shows that IT investment has a positive impact on firm performance in 
China (Kim, Xiang, & Lee, 2008).   
Investment can be identified from the capital expenditure which shows cash 
outflows for long-lived assets  (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). In the stock 
market, announcement of increases (decreases) in capital expenditures are 
associated with significant positive (negative) share price (McConnel & 
Muscarella, 1985) and (Chung, Wright, & Charoenwong, 1998).  
Investment refers to an activity of spending the funds for fixed assets either to 
increase the availability of the means of production or simply replaces depreciated 
capital goods (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010).  In the statement of cash flows, 
investing activities of the company shows the cash flows from purchasing and 
selling fixed assets such as plants, property and equipment; selling and acquiring 
investment securities, and disbursement and repayment of the loans.  
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Along with intangible assets, plants, property and equipment are called as 
long-term operating assets since it plays important roles for operating activities 
and generating revenues. These assets are not purchased for resale to customers, 
but are seized and utilized as infrastructure to produce and distribute the products 
and services of the company sufficiently, in the end, to generate revenue (Stice & 
Stice, 2006). 
To sum up, the investment gives information about the company’s effort to 
maintain their operation by the facts of how much company spends the money on 
property, plants and equipment. It is crucial because the long-term asset is 
diminished over time. This figure is aimed to expand the production and the cash 
flow generating capacity of the firm in the future (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010).  
Hypothesis 4: Investment positively affects the firm performance 
3.5 Size and Firm Performance 
A meta-analysis study by Gooding & Wagner III (1985) reveals the size and 
performance relationship. The study differentiates between size-performance 
relationships with organizational size-performance relationships using 31 
literatures. Size and performance are non-significantly or negatively related 
because of the free-rider and process-loss models of group behavior. Even so, 
when the performance is measured using an absolute number of size and 
productivity, the result is positively related to each other. Likewise, when the 
performance is measured as relative (output-input) terms, the findings are no 
positive relationship to each other (Gooding & Wagner III, 1985). 
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Likewise, the study of Dogan (2013) investigates the effect of firm size on 
profitability. Utilizing data by 200 of Istanbul Stock Exchange 2008-2011, the 
author uses “Return on Assets” (ROA) as firm profitability indicators and total 
assets, total sales and number of employees as size indicators. The analysis finds a 
positive effect of size towards firm performance, though only liquidity has 
positive relations to return on assets (Dogan, 2013). From similar countries, using 
different span of time data from 2005-2011, researchers also find that firm size, 
from the perspective of total assets and total sales, positively affects the 
profitability of manufacturing companies (Akbas & Karaduman, 2012). 
Many scholars investigate the roles of the size towards firm performances. 
The results are (1) economies of scale in operations costing (Majumdar, 1997), (2) 
larger control over external stakeholders (Orlitzky, 2001), (3) support corporation 
to build various capabilities (Majumdar, 1997 and Orlitzky, 2001) and (4) better 
access of finance in the term of internal resources, issuance of equity, or debt 
(Audretscha & Elston, 2002).  
The economies of scale exist when the per-unit cost of production decrease as 
the level of production increases (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). It relates to 
the average cost per unit of producing goods and services. There are two 
components in the production cost, fixed cost and variable cost. The variable costs 
change as the quantity of products, while the fixed costs do not change (Ross, 
Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). Therefore, the production cost per unit declines as 
the quantity of goods increased. 
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The internal funds of the corporation in some extent build various companies’ 
capabilities, including the promotional in term of attracting better workers 
(Orlitzky, 2001). Kadapakkam, Kumar & Riddick (1998) investigates the relation 
of cash flow availability with firm investment in developed countries. They find 
that availability of internal fund affects the amount of investment of corporate 
investment in all OECD countries. However, the size of the company positively 
affects the cash flow-investment sensitivity, meaning that high-cash-flow 
sensitivity finds in a large firm size group and vice versa (Kadapakkam, Kumar, 
& Riddick, 1998). 
Audretscha & Elston (2002) reveal that in Germany since 1974, the firms 
have been obliged to manage pension funds of the employees. However, since the 
small company unable to obtain capital market at an interest rate, these funds 
become a source of capital for firms, particularly the large companies and loosen 
their liquidity. The large companies are able to dominate the utilization of the 
available funds while the company with strict funds is very limited in term of 
utilizing the internal earnings and the acquiring fresh fund through issuing equity. 
The accesses for financing of the smaller firms are more limited than of the larger 
firms (Audretscha & Elston, 2002) as smaller firms have less access to external 
capital markets (Kadapakkam, Kumar, & Riddick, 1998). 
In summary, size of the company has many various roles to support the firm 
operation and performance, including for the economic opportunities, internal 
investment and access for funds. The research postulates that size will positively 
affect the firm performance because those advantages. 
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Hypothesis 5: Size positively affects firm performance 
3.6 Age and Firm Performance 
Another character of the company which affects firm performance is age. The 
connection between age and firm performance vary, could be positive, negative or 
even no relation. Loderer & Waelchli (2010) investigates the relation of age and 
firm performance using public companies data between 1974-2004. They find that 
the firm performance declines along the time. The profitability of the company 
drop as age increases, expenses spikes with growth declines, while innovation 
falls behind the industry average.  Similar finding is revealed Dogan (2013). The 
study uses data of 200 of Istanbul Stock Exchange 2008-2011 and finds that there 
is a negative relation between age and firm performance.  
In the other hand, using Spanish manufacturing firm 1998-2006, Coad, 
Segarra, & Teruel, (2010) asserts “milk hypothesis and wine hypothesis.” The 
milk hypothesis mean firm deteriorated with time while wine hypothesis mean 
firm improved with age (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010, p. 24).  
The wine hypothesis is supported by the findings that older firms improve 
over time with increasing levels of productivity, profitability, bigger assets, lower 
leverage, and ability to convert sales growth into the subsequent growth of profits 
and productivity. In the other hand, milk hypothesis is supported with the 
evidence that firm performance declines along with increasing of age. Older firms 
have worse figure than younger firm in term of sales, profitability and 
productivity growth. In addition, older company lost their capability and failed to 
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translate from employment growth to sales and productivity growth (Coad, 
Segarra, & Teruel, 2010).  
There are two primary findings related the effects of age to firm performances. 
In order to explain the phenomena, there are many theories, namely inertia effects 
(Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010), corporate aging (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010) 
selection effects, and learning-by-doing effects (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010).  
The milk hypothesis has two supported theories, the inertia effect and 
corporate aging. Inertia effect is a condition where firm becomes less productive 
as age increases because of increasingly inert and inflexible. Old firms are 
exposed to obsolescence when they do not suit in the new business situation, and 
exposed to senescence because of the accumulation of regulations, habits, and 
organizational governance (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010).  
Furthermore, Loderer & Waelchli (2010) recommends corporate aging to 
explain the negative relation between age and firm performance with two 
supported factors, i.e. organizational rigidities and rent seeking. Organizational 
rigidities result from the past success which followed by firms to transform their 
story into the organization, regulations, culture, process and habits. This situation 
creates rigid organization where the older company generates low profitability, 
has a lack of innovation and experiencing degeneration with an unbalanced CEO 
compensation with the provided solution (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). 
Selection effect and learning by doing is the supporter of wine hypothesis. 
Coad et.al (2010) reports “selection effects arise when selection pressures 
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progressively eliminate the weakest firms, and result in an increase in the average 
productivity level of surviving firms, even if the productivity levels of individual 
firms do not change with age” (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010), p.3). It means that 
over time, the companies with low productivity will be extinct because lost in the 
competition and failed to respond the change and results high-productivity firms 
remain in business.  
Learning by doing is a situation where a corporation accumulates skills and 
knowledge from regular production line to create better technique and technology 
in order to improve productivity. In addition to better business experiences, over 
the time, the firms also could be benefited from the establishment of customers 
and supplier network (Coad et.al, 2010).  
To conclude, there are two main relations between age and firm performance, 
negative and positive. Both are supported by strong theories. Therefore, the study 
hypotheses that (a) age have a positive relation with the firm performance, and (b) 
age has a positive relation with the firm performance.    
Hypothesis 6a: Age positively affects firm performance 
Hypothesis 6b: Age negatively affects firm performance 
3.7 Location and Firm Performance 
Location plays important roles in firm operation. Sridhar & Wan (2010) 
compares the firm’s location choices in China, India, and Brazil. In three 
countries, capital cities are not a popular place as a firm location because of the 
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high cost of doing business in the city, especially labour cost. The labour intensive 
industry chooses mid to large cities to decrease the training cost, and proximity to 
inputs, especially raw materials and suppliers, attracts firm in China and India, but 
in Brazil is the opposite (Sridhar & Wan, 2010).  
In different research, Minai & Lucky (2011) investigate the location’s role 
Lagos-Nigeria. They find that location is the moderating factor between external 
factors and firm characteristics, and firm performance. It means location converts 
the external factors into the firm performance (Minai & Lucky, 2011). In Britain, 
firms prefer to locate their green-field close to the identical manufacturing plants, 
even though government provides subsidies in the other regions (Devereux , 
Griffith, & Simpson, 2007). 
In certain circumstances, location gives advantages to firms. Urban area 
supports the new entrants of companies because of the ”markets are characterized 
by knowledge spill-overs across firms and workers, a large customer base, easy 
access to information on new technologies, easy availability of differentiated 
skills in the labor markets, close proximity to suppliers, and superior 
transportation, telecommunication, and energy infrastructure” (Yu, Orazem, & 
Jolly, 2011), p.673). 
To condense, location support firm with proximity to customer and 
materials (Lucky, 2012). Situation in Japanese energy and electricity sector is 
different. The country is low of natural resources and results Japan imports 87.6 
percent of energy supply, and about half of the supply is converted into electric 
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power (Statistic Bureau, 2013). The role of location is limited to proximity of 
customers. Nemoto et.al (1993) argues that the in term of an electric company, 
Tokyo, Kansai and Chubu companies can make the most of their efficient 
transmission and distribution network systems due to dense customers. Tokyo, 
Kansai and Chubu companies cover the three largest metropolitan areas of Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya. These three companies can make the most of their efficient 
transmission and distribution network systems due to dense customers (Nemoto, 
Nakanishi, & Madono, 1993).  
This study postulates that better location supports the financial performance 
by provides dense of customers. 
Hypothesis 7: Location positively affects firm performance 
3.8 Ownership and Firm Performance 
Government ownership has both positive and negative effects on firm 
performance. In China, the effect of ownership to the firm performance had been 
analysed by Yu (2013). Applying panel data with 10,639 public companies in 
2003–2010, the author finds that government ownership has a U-shaped 
relationship with firm performance. It means the government ownership 
negatively affects the firm performance and in a certain point the effects turned to 
positive direction (Yu M. , 2013).  
However, from a similar region based study of Le & Chizema (2011) reveals 
different finding. The study collected financial data of 1,154 companies in 2004 
and 1,255 companies 2005 and reports that the state ownership has a negative 
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impact to firm performance at low level, and the relation becomes positive at high 
level (Le & Chizema, 2011). 
From banking sector, the relation between government ownership with firm 
performance is investigated Kiruri (2013). The investigation reveals that in Kenya, 
concentration of state ownership has negative and substantial impacts on 
profitability. In addition, the larger concentration of state ownership leads to 
lower profitability (Kiruri, 2013). 
Many arguments about the relation of state ownership with firm performance, 
both positively and negatively. Yu (2013) argues that the state ownership supports 
the companies through benefits of government support and political connections. 
Furthermore, increasing the level of government shares enhances firm 
performance and provides financing and resources. For example, in China, 
government support the state-owned, government with privileged market entrance 
regulations, favourable taxation, financial access, and loan decisions to support 
(Le & Chizema, 2011). 
Yu (2013) also asserts a negative relation between firm performance and state 
ownership. “The existence of state and legal person shares has created a few 
problems. Because they are mostly government-owned, the standard principal-
agent problem is compounded by a multiple-principal problem, as government 
owners may pursue different objectives that do not necessarily relate to profit 
maximization” (Yu M. , 2013), p. 77). For instance, in Kenya, the government is 
involved in ownership of banking firms to accelerate the financial and economic 
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development or in order to provide employment and benefits for political 
constituents (Kiruri, 2013).  
Giving arguments and examples above, this study hypothesis that government 
ownership has positive influences to firm performance (H8a) and government 
ownership has negative influences to firm performance (H8b). 
Hypothesis 8a: Ownership positively affects firm performance  
Hypothesis 8b: Ownership negatively affects firm performance  
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Chapter 4.  
Research Methodology  
This chapter covers brief explanation of the methodology of the 
research, including research design, panel data analysis, fixed effects, and 
random effects. In the last section, it also provides an introduction on the 
statistical method to choose between fixed effects and random effects. 
This research is aimed to find the causality relation from the internal 
factors of the firms to the firm performance specifically financial 
performance. When the relation is significant, the notation of the relation 
will be observed and analysed. Positive relation means the increasing of the 
factor will improve the performance while negative relation means the 
additional of the factor will reduce the performance. This section covers the 
explanation of the tools for defining the relation. As explained in the 
previous chapter, the hypotheses are: 
1. H1a Leverage positively affects firm performance 
H1b Leverage negatively affects firm performance 
2. H2 Liquidity negatively affects firm performance 
3. H3 Depreciation negatively affects firm performance 
4. H4 Investment positively affects firm performance 
5. H5 Firm size positively affects firm performance 
6. H6 Firm age negatively affects firm performance 
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7. H7 Firm location positively affects firm performance 
8. H8a Ownership positively affects firm performance 
H8b Ownership negatively affects firm performance 
4.1 Research Design 
The research uses regression in order to investigate one-way relation. 
Quantitative approach will be conducted with statistical analysis of panel data 
regression method. In this situation, the performance is treated as the dependent 
which affected by the observed independent factor. Independent variables are the 
factors, in the other hand dependent variables are firm performance. 
In the research, independent variables are limited to internal factor of the 
company. Those factors are leverage, liquidity, depreciation, investment, size, age, 
location and ownership.  
 
Figure 4.1: Illustrated scheme of research design  
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In term of firm performance as dependent variables, there are 8 factors, i.e. 
return on asset, return on equity, and return on sales, share price, earnings per 
share, price earnings ratio, total revenue and net income. A factor will be regarded 
as significantly affects the firm performances when minimum 2 out of 3 
accounting-based measures, namely return on asset, return on equity and return on 
sales, are influenced with similar notation (positive or negative). After the relation 
is revealed, the first approach to explain is by observing the regression results on 
the total revenue and net income.  
Interpretation of the research will be done carefully with several 
limitations. The analysis on detail explanation of the relation between controlled 
factors and dependent variables use the association of factor with revenue, net 
income, and return on sales. When the factor positively affects the revenue, but 
not net income, it is interpreted that the efficiency of the business operation is 
getting worse because larger input only results in the same amount or less. 
Otherwise, when the factor negatively affects revenue, but positively affects net 
income, it means the productivity and efficiency of the operation are improved. 
In addition, the result of the above comparison will be checked with the 
effect on return on sales to provide a comparative analysis on the efficiency and 
the productivity of the business operation.  Further, return on assets uses earnings 
before interest and taxes and return on equity utilises earnings after taxes. 
Accordingly, taxes are excluded from the calculation. Return on equity uses 
earning from the operation where only the related taxes are used. The above 
definition assists the interpretation as well as profit margin and revenue. 
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Further, the market-based measures, namely share price, earnings per 
share, price earnings ratio are used for identifying the market responses on the 
specific factor.   
4.2 Data Collection  
In the investigation, the research finds the list data of energy and 
electricity from the COMPUSTAT. The advantage of COMPUSTAT is the list of 
similar sectors can be found within second by choosing similar categories. Based 
on Global Industry Classification Standard of Standard and Poor (Standard & 
Poor, 2010), Energy Sector has code 1010 and consists of Energy Equipment & 
Services and Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels. In the other hand, electricity is 
classified under utilities sector with code 5510 and one group with gas, water, 
multi-utilities, and independent power producers and energy traders. The two 
industries are interconnected, so the analysis is conducted for two sectors as 
energy and electricity industry.  
From the COMPUSTAT, in total there are 57 firms; with 11 firms are 
incomplete data. Accordingly, only 46 firms will be used for the research. Here is 
the detailed number of companies in each Subsector. 
Table 4.1:  The list of 4 categories energy and electricity firm in Japan 
No Subsector Number of Companies 
1 Electricity Utilities 12  
2 Gas Utilities 12  
3 Oil, Gas & Coals Companies 10 
4 Trading 10  
5 Chemical & Machinery 2 
 Total  46 
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After the firms are being listed, the next step is searching the data about 
the independent variables and dependent variables in the Standard and Poor 
Capital IQ (S&P Capital IQ) database as the main source of the data. Additional 
data is gathered from various sources such as COMPUSTAT, Tokyo Stock 
Exchange website (http://www.tse.or.jp/english) and Statistical Handbook of 
Japan (Statistic Bureau, 2013). Additional data are collected to complete the 
unavailable data and also to confirm the information.  
4.3 Panel Data Analysis 
Baltagi (2013) defines panel data as “the pooling of observations on a 
cross section of household, countries, firms, and others over several periods” 
(Baltagi, 2013), p. 1). While Kohler & Kreuter (2012) explain panel data as 
dataset which consist of similar measures of the same individuals over time, and 
resulted in same variables for the same respondents at different points in time 
(Kohler & Kreuter, 2012).  
Brüderl (2005) reports there are 4 advantages of panel data. First, panel 
data give more informative about variability, provide the less collinearity, and 
shows more degrees of freedom. In addition, the estimates of panel data are more 
efficient. Second, panel data permit investigating individual dynamics (i.e. 
separating age). Third, panel data provide information on the time-sequences of 
events. Lastly, the panel allows to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity 
(Brüderl, 2005), p. 2) 
45 
 
In the research, collected data consists of 46 firms, 16 variables (8 
independents and 8 dependents), with a time horizon from 2001 to 2010 which 
will result in maximum dataset contains 460 observations. The dataset has 
fulfilled the requirement of panel data since it is a cross section with 16 variables 
of 46 firms, and annually repeated within 10 years. 
Panel data analysis is conducted with one-way regression using STATA 
12. One-way analysis is conducted to find the causality relation from independent 
variables to the dependent variables. In one-way regression, there are many 
options to investigate the data panel, i.e. random effect and fixed effect. 
4.4 Fixed Effects 
Fixed effects are designed for analysing the effect of variables change over 
time because it explores the association between independent variables and 
dependent variables within the country, person, and the company (Torres-Reyna).  
One of the assumptions for fixed effects is the factors inside the individual 
can affect or bias the independent variables, and it should be controlled, hence 
fixed effect removes time-invariant (e.g. culture, religion, gender, and race) 
characteristic of independent variable to provide a better assessment (Torres-
Reyna). Furthermore, the time-invariants are unique for individual and should not 
be correlated with other individual characteristic.  
The above explanation conforms to Kohler & Kreuter (2012). The fixed 
effects neglect time-invariants characteristics in order to reduce the bias of 
resulted coefficient by controls all time-invariant differences between individuals. 
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That is why fixed effects are designed to investigate the causes of change within 
an individual (Kohler & Kreuter, 2012).  
To simplify, Bilal, Khan, Tufail, & Najm-ul-Sehar (2013) concludes 
“Fixed effects model is simply a model in which slope coefficients are constant 
while the intercept varies across the cross-sectional unit in the panel” (Bilal, Khan, 
Tufail, & Najm-ul-Sehar, 2013) p.14). The model is below: 
PERFit= β0i+ β1LEVit+ β2LIQit + β3DEPit + β4INVit + β5SIZEit + β6AGEit + 
β7LOCit + β8OWNit + uit 
PERFit  : Performance of company i at year t 
LEVit  : Leverage of company i at year t 
LIQit  : Liquidity of company i at year t 
DEPit  : Depreciation of company i at year t 
 INVit  : Investment of company i at year t 
SIZEit  : Size of company i at year t 
AGEit  : Age of company i at year t 
LOCit  : Location of company i at year t 
OWNit  : Ownership of company i at year t 
uit  : Error term 
4.5 Random Effects 
In contrast with fixed effects model, in the random effects assumes “the 
entity’s error is not correlated with the independent variables which permit the 
time-invariant variables to play as explanatory variables” (Torres-Reyna). To 
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shorten, Bilal, Khan, Tufail, & Najm-ul-Sehar (2013) concludes “Random effects 
model is a model which treats cross-sectional unit as well as variation within 
cross-sectional unit in the model” (Bilal, Khan, Tufail, & Najm-ul-Sehar, 2013) 
p.14). The model is below: 
PERFit= β0+ β1LEVit+ β2LIQit + β3DEPit + β4INVit + β5SIZEit + β6AGEit + 
β7LOCit + β8OWNit + uit+ eit 
PERFit  : Performance of company i at year t 
LEVit  : Leverage of company i at year t 
LIQit  : Liquidity of company i at year t 
DEPit  : Depreciation of company i at year t 
 INVit  : Investment of company i at year t 
SIZEit  : Size of company i at year t 
AGEit  : Age of company i at year t 
LOCit  : Location of company i at year t 
OWNit  : Ownership of company i at year t 
uit  : Between-entity error term  
eit  : Within-entity company error  
4.6 Random or Fixed  
The weakness of fixed effect is that the model is less efficient than a 
random effect specifically higher variance, and also the model does not build the 
coefficients of time-invariant variables  (McGovern, 2012).  
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Similarly, Hsiao (2007) concludes that the advantage of fixed effects is the 
disadvantage of the random effect, namely fixed effect allows individual and time 
specific effect to correlate with independent variables. While the disadvantages of 
fixed effects are it does not cover a finite number of observations in term of time 
or individually, and fixed effects do not cover the time-invariant variable  (Hsiao, 
2007).  
In order to decide whether fixed effects or random effect to analysis the 
regression, Hsiao (2007), McGovern (2012) & Torres-Reyna suggest Hausman 
test. The test is based on the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the random 
effects result is similar with of fixed effects. Accordingly, the Hausman test can 
be applied by comparing the two models (McGovern, 2012). 
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Chapter 5.  
Data Analysis and Results 
Chapter 5 covers the detailed explanation of the data, analysis and the 
results. The data are collected from COMPUSTAT, S&P Capital IQ, Tokyo Stock 
Exchange website (http://www.tse.or.jp/english/), and Statistical Handbook of 
Japan (Statistic Bureau, 2013). The data are about independent variables and 
dependent variables. The collected data are processed using STATA, specifically 
using fixed effects, random effects, and Hausman test. The last section is about 
the final result of the data processing. 
5.1 Independent Variables 
Independent variables consist of eight variables, i.e. leverage, liquidity, 
depreciation, investment, size, age, and location. S&P Capital IQ provides data of 
leverage, liquidity, depreciation, and ownership. It also provides data of capital 
expenditure which used as a proxy for the investment. Further, size is measured 
from the total assets, collected from the balance sheet of S&P Capital IQ. Age is 
the number years since the establishment of the company. Location uses dummy 
variable, and the data comes from the Japanese statistical bureau. Table 5.2 shows 
the summary of the explanation and the next subsection is the detailed explanation 
on each statistical property of independent variables in sub-section. 
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Table 5.1: Independent variables in the STATA analysis  
No Variable  Explanation  Sources  
1 Leverage Total debt/equity S&P Capital IQ 
2 Liquidity  Current assets/current liabilities S&P Capital IQ 
3 Ln_Depreciation  Natural logarithm of depreciation  S&P Capital IQ 
4 Investment  Natural logarithm of capital 
expenditure with 1 year delay 
S&P Capital IQ 
5 Size  Natural logarithm of total assets S&P Capital IQ 
6 Age  Current year – year of established  Tokyo Stock 
Exchange 
7 Location  Dummy variable, 1 for Prefecture with 
density more than 1000 per square km 
and 0 for Prefecture with density less 
than 1000/square km 
Statistical 
Bureau 
8 Ownership  Government ownership in percent S&P Capital IQ 
 
5.1.1. Leverage 
Leverage is the ratio of debt over equity. The variable is showing the 
capital structure of the companies, especially the debt ratio. The data about 
leverage comes from S&P Capital IQ in the ratios chapter of the financial report. 
From the data extracted from the source, there are 453 observations for the period 
10 years from 2001-2010. In total, there are seven missed observations. The data 
of leverage have averaged 1.713, with standard deviation 1.631. Uehara Sei Shoji 
in 2009 (with value 0.002) has the lowest debt while Electric Power Development 
in 2001 (with value 15.277) owns the highest debt. The value 1.713 means that 
the debt is 0.713 higher than the equity. 
5.1.2. Liquidity  
Liquidity is how easy to convert assets to cash (Reimers, 2011). In this 
research, current ratio is used to measure liquidity. Current ratio is current assets 
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divided by current liabilities. The data about liquidity derives from S&P Capital 
IQ in the ratios chapter of the financial report. There are 453 observations for the 
period 10 years from 2001-2010 from the database; only seven observations are 
not available. Liquidity has mean 0.929, with standard deviation 0.667. The most 
illiquid company is Kanto Natural Gas Development in 2010 (with value 0.036), 
in contrast the most liquid company is Japan Petroleum in 2010 (with value 4.801). 
The value 0.929 means that current assets are 0.071 lower than the current 
liabilities, the company current assets cannot cover 0.071 of the current liabilities. 
5.1.3. Depreciation  
Depreciation is the amount of the estimated dollar cost of long-term assets 
that were used in the production process in annual basis. The data about 
depreciation draws from the cash flow statement within the financial report of 
S&P Capital IQ. There are 450 observations; with 10 others are not available. 
Depreciation has mean 74735.58, with standard deviation 157322. Daiya Tsusho 
in 2010 has the lowest depreciation with value 26.424, and Tokyo Electric Power 
Company in 2001 possesses the highest depreciation with value 964625. 
However, the standard deviation of depreciation value, 157322, is very 
high, so small changes will not significant. In order to increase the sensitivity of 
the analysis, the depreciation value will be replaced with the natural logarithm of 
depreciation (Ln_Depreciation). The fact that the value of depreciation has been 
always positive supports the replacement. The Ln_Depreciation has mean 9.263, 
with standard deviation 2.249, minimum value 3.274 and maximum value 13.779.   
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5.1.4. Investment  
Investment is aimed either to increase the efficiency of the operation or to 
expand the market. This research utilizes capital expenditure as a proxy of 
investment because capital expenditure is spending that is documented as an asset, 
not an expense, at the transaction is incurred (Reimers, 2011). Thus, the benefit of 
the expenditure will be given for long term. The data on capital expenditure takes 
from the cash flow statement within the financial report of S&P Capital IQ. There 
are 450 observations, and only 10 others are missing. The capital expenditure has 
mean 68282.26, with standard deviation 149266.9. Daiya Tsusho in 2010 
generated the lowest investment with value 7.7, on the other hand, Tokyo Electric 
Power Company in 2001 made the highest investment with value 1095311. 
Similar with depreciation, the standard deviation of the capital expenditure 
is high (149266.9) with no negative value, hence to increase the sensitivity, the 
analysis uses the natural logarithm of depreciation. In addition, since investment 
requires a certain time to influence on the performance, the regression uses the 
previous year of the natural logarithm depreciation (Ln_Capex_1), with 
assumption investment will affect the performance in the following year. 
Ln_Capex_1 has 414 observations, with mean 9.171023, standard deviation 
2.381154, minimum value 0, and maximum value 13.85641. 
5.1.5. Size  
Size is measured by the total assets because energy and electricity sector is 
a capital intensive industry. Therefore, the number of assets shows the capacity 
and the size of the firms. Total assets can be found in the balance sheet within the 
53 
 
financial report of S&P Capital IQ. There are 453 observations. Only 7 
observations are missing. The total asset has mean 1235838, with standard 
deviation 2456196. The smallest company is Japan Wind Development in 2001, 
(with total asset value 850), while the largest firm is Tokyo Electric Power 
Company in 2002 (with total asset 14578579). 
Similar with depreciation, the standard deviation of the total asset is high 
(2456196) with no negative value, thus to increase the sensitivity, the analysis 
uses the natural logarithm of total asset (Ln_Asset). Ln_Asset has 453 
observations, with mean 12.4346, standard deviation 1.940178, minimum value 
6.745236, and maximum value 16.49506. 
5.1.6. Age  
This study identifies the relation between age and firm performance. Age 
of the companies is calculated from the year of the establishment. The date of 
establishment of the companies can be found on the website of Tokyo Stock 
Exchanges. Average age of the companies is 64.196 years from 460 observations, 
with standard deviation 21.389, the youngest firm is Japan Wind Development 
(age 2 year in 2001), while the oldest firm is Tokyo Gas (age 125 year in 2010). 
5.1.7. Location  
This research investigates the effects of location on the firm performance. 
The focus of the location is about the relation with the customers because most of 
the resources in Japan are imported. The research uses the location of the 
company and calculates the density of every prefecture. However, this condition 
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is only applied for the regulated industry, which creates oligopoly, i.e. gas utilities 
and electricity utilities, while other sectors are not geographically limited. 
Data of Population by Prefecture in Japan Statistical Yearbook (Statistic 
Bureau, 2014) provides data of the number of residents in 1920-201toth year basis, 
but the density only provided for 2010. Therefore, the information of population 
density is calculated using available figures. During 2000-2010, prefectures of 
Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Fukuoka have density more 
than 1.000 per square kilometres (score 1), and the rest have less (score 0). 
Table 5.2: The dummy variables of location 
Prefecture 
Area 
(km2) 
Population density (per km
2
) Score for dummy 
2000 2005 2010 2012 2000 2005 2010 
Japan 371 341.81 344.08 344.86 343.40 0 0 0 
Hokkaido 78 73.07 72.36 70.79 70.20 0 0 0 
Aomori 9 155.69 151.58 144.83 142.40 0 0 0 
Iwate 15 94.65 92.58 88.90 87.10 0 0 0 
Miyagi 7 327.84 327.15 325.49 322.30 0 0 0 
Akita 11 104.36 100.58 95.32 93.30 0 0 0 
Yamagata 9 135.41 132.37 127.25 125.40 0 0 0 
Fukushima 13 159.58 156.88 152.23 147.20 0 0 0 
Ibaraki 6 494.32 492.50 491.67 487.20 0 0 0 
Tochigi 6 315.34 317.23 315.82 313.30 0 0 0 
Gumma 6 320.83 320.67 318.13 315.60 0 0 0 
Saitama 4 1,822.24 1,852.70 1,889.74 1,894.20 1 1 1 
Chiba 5 1,153.15 1,178.45 1,209.59 1,205.50 1 1 1 
Tokyo 2 5,485.52 5,718.78 5,983.42 6,015.70 1 1 1 
Kanagawa 2 3,507.05 3,631.80 3,737.55 3,745.40 1 1 1 
Niigata 12 199.07 195.45 190.87 188.70 0 0 0 
Toyama 4 266.68 264.54 260.02 257.40 0 0 0 
Ishikawa 4 283.83 282.14 281.18 279.50 0 0 0 
Fukui 4 199.62 197.94 194.09 192.40 0 0 0 
Yamanashi 4 201.47 200.79 195.80 193.30 0 0 0 
Nagano 13 164.88 163.46 160.19 158.70 0 0 0 
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Gifu 11 200.37 200.27 197.80 195.90 0 0 0 
Shizuoka 8 488.05 491.28 487.79 483.90 0 0 0 
Aichi 5 1,360.62 1,401.57 1,431.71 1,434.80 1 1 1 
Mie 6 323.97 325.71 323.62 321.00 0 0 0 
Shiga 4 333.33 342.51 350.21 351.20 0 0 0 
Kyoto 5 575.54 576.41 573.79 571.40 0 0 0 
Osaka 2 4,642.81 4,649.14 4,674.45 4,669.70 1 1 1 
Hyogo 8 663.21 667.99 667.63 665.60 0 0 0 
Nara 4 393.97 387.96 382.50 379.50 0 0 0 
Wakayama 5 229.60 222.30 215.00 212.00 0 0 0 
Tottori 3 176.74 175.01 169.82 167.80 0 0 0 
Shimane 7 115.32 112.30 108.51 107.00 0 0 0 
Okayama 7 275.62 276.47 274.77 273.50 0 0 0 
Hiroshima 8 341.07 340.84 338.94 337.40 0 0 0 
Yamaguchi 6 253.49 247.69 240.72 237.40 0 0 0 
Tokushima 4 201.12 197.70 191.60 189.40 0 0 0 
Kagawa 2 548.94 543.04 534.46 530.70 0 0 0 
Ehime 6 266.00 261.54 254.95 252.10 0 0 0 
Kochi 7 116.47 113.90 109.32 107.60 0 0 0 
Fukuoka 5 1,005.17 1,011.99 1,016.39 1,019.00 1 1 1 
Saga 2 362.35 357.80 351.19 348.30 0 0 0 
Nagasaki 4 374.40 365.02 352.19 347.50 0 0 0 
Kumamoto 7 252.46 250.15 246.76 245.40 0 0 0 
Oita 6 194.43 192.68 190.61 188.70 0 0 0 
Miyazaki 8 152.43 150.22 147.87 146.70 0 0 0 
Kagoshima 9 196.25 192.62 187.46 185.70 0 0 0 
Okinawa  2 572.38 591 605 612 0 0 0 
5.1.8. Ownership  
In terms of ownership, the research utilizes the percentages of the 
government’s shares in the companies, both central government and local 
government. S&P Capital IQ provides the data about government ownership, 
specifically in the public ownership section. However, in order to confirm the data, 
certain companies’ related-data can be found in a Tokyo Stock Exchanges website 
within the corporate governance section.   
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There are 442 observations, with 28 observations are not available. The 
data of government ownership has average .0143625, with standard 
deviation .0836251, and 0% as the minimum value, and 83.944% as the maximum 
value. Most of the companies have 0% value, while the government’s biggest 
shares was found in Japan Petroleum Exploration in  2009. That ownership of 
government has two types of shareholders, Government of Japan (34.001%) and 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (49.943%). 
Table 5.3 The statistical properties of independent variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Leverage 453 1.712819 1.631011 0.002189 15.27748 
Liquidity 453 0.929987 0.6667669 0.036534 4.801646 
Ln_Depreciation 450 9.262685 2.249659 3.274273 13.77949 
Ln_Capex_1 414 9.171023 2.381154 0 13.85641 
Ln_Assets 453 12.4346 1.940178 6.745236 16.49506 
Age 460 64.19565 21.38823 2 125 
Location 460 0.6956522 0.4606316 0 1 
Ownership 442 0. 0143625     0. 0836251           0 0.8394379 
 
5.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables represent the firms' performance, especially from 
a financial perspective. There are eight items, i.e. return on equity, return on asset, 
return on sales, share price, earning per share, price earnings ratio, revenue and 
net income. Table 5.5 shows a summary of explanation and data source of 
dependent variables. The following sub-section explains the detailed explanation 
about simple statistical property of each independent variable. 
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Table 5.4: The dependent variables in the STATA analysis 
No Variable  Explanation  Sources  
1 Ln_Revenue  Natural logarithm of total revenue S&P Capital IQ 
2 ROS Normalized net income divide by total 
revenue 
S&P Capital IQ 
3 Net Income Net income S&P Capital IQ 
4 ROA Standardized earnings before tax and 
interest (EBIT) divided by average total 
assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
5 ROE Earnings from continuing operation 
divided by average shareholder equity 
S&P Capital IQ 
6 Share price Share price at the end of fiscal year  COMPUSTAT 
7 EPS Normalized net income divided by 
weighted average shares outstanding 
S&P Capital IQ 
8 P/E ratio Share price divide by normalized 
earnings per share 
S&P Capital IQ 
 
5.2.1. Return on Assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) is the ratio of the earnings before tax and interest 
(EBIT) to total assets which show how much return of each yen of the assets 
before interest and tax. The data of ROA comes from the ratio section of the 
financial report of S&P Capital IQ. The ROA data from the database are 
calculated using normalized net income. It means the data already calculate 
business cycle. There are 444 observations, with 16 observations are missing. The 
ROA has mean 0.0251, with standard deviation 0.0304. AOC Holding in 2009 
possessed the most unproductive assets with the value -0.054, and  INPEX in 
2006 had the most productive assets with value 0.3. The value 0.3 means that one 
yen of assets generates 0.3 yen net income for the company. 
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5.2.2. Return on Equity 
Return on Equity (ROE) is the ratio of the earnings from operation of total 
common equity, which shows how much earnings generated from each yen of 
investment from the investors (Brigham et.al, 2010). The data of ROE can be 
extracted from the ratio section of the financial report of S&P Capital IQ. In 
contrast with the calculation of the ROA, the ROE in the database is calculated 
using earnings from operation. There are 444 observations, with 16 observations 
are not available. The ROE has mean 0.0453, with standard deviation 0.104. The 
lowest return per equity is generated by AOC Holding in 2006 (with value -0.777), 
and the highest return per equity is created by Fuji Kosan in 2004 (with value 
0.346). The value 0.346 means that one yen of common equity generates 0.346 
yen earnings from operation for the company. 
5.2.3. Return on Sales  
Return on Sales (ROS) is also called profit margin, which defined as the 
ratio of the net income to total revenue, which shows how much net income 
generated from each yen of revenue (Brigham et.al, 2010). The data of ROS can 
be extracted from the ratio section of the financial report of S&P Capital IQ. 
Similar with ROA, the ROS in the database are calculated using normalized net 
income, which deduct the portion of corporate tax 37.5% from the net income. 
There are 453 observations, with 7 observations are missing. The ROS has mean 
0.0319, with standard deviation 0.0491. The lowest return per sales is generated 
by Japan Wind Development in 2006 (with value -0.268), and the highest return 
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per sales is created by INPEX in 2009 (with value 0.376). The value 0.376 means 
that one yen of sales generates 0.376 yen net income for the company. 
5.2.4. Share Price 
Share Price is showing the price of stock in the stock exchange, 
mostly in Tokyo Stock Exchange. The data on the share price can be 
extracted from the historical capitalization section of the financial report of 
S&P Capital IQ. However, the data is synchronized with the date of the 
financial report published, in certain companies the data of share price are 
downloaded from COMPUSTAT to find the closest date to the end of the 
fiscal year of the firm. There are 449 observations, with 11 observations are 
not available. The data of the share price has mean 17207.54, with standard 
deviation 105968.5. The cheapest price was owned Daiya Tsusho in 2009 
(with value 34), and INPEX in 2008 had the most expensive with value 
1110000.  
Similar with depreciation, the standard deviation of the share price is 
high (105968.5) with no negative value, hence to increase the sensitivity, the 
analysis uses the natural logarithm of the share price (Ln_Share_Price). 
Ln_Share_Price has 449 observations, with mean 6.727382, standard 
deviation 1.478864, minimum value 3.526361, and maximum value 
13.91987. 
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5.2.5. Earnings per Shares 
Earnings per Share (EPS) are the ratio of the standardized net income to 
the number of the outstanding shares which show how much net income generated 
from one share. The data of EPS can be extracted from the income statement 
section of the financial report of S&P Capital IQ. Similarly with the calculation of 
the ROA, the EPS in the database is calculated using normalized net income. 
There are 453 observations, with 7 observations are missing. The EPS has mean 
71.786, with standard deviation 89.253. The lowest return per shares is generated 
by AOC Holding in 2009 (with value -299.27), and the highest return per shares is 
created by Okinawa Electric Power Company in 2006 (with value 578.934). The 
value 578.934 means that one share generates 578.934 yen net income for the 
company. 
5.2.6. Price Earnings Ratio 
Price Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) is the ratio of the share price to earnings 
per shares which shows how much yen investor willing to pay per yen of reported 
earnings (Brigham et.al, 2010). The data on P/E Ratio is calculated from the share 
price divided with EPS, which both data available in S&P Capital IQ and 
COMPUSTAT. There are 448 observations, with 12 observations are missing. 
The data on P/E Ratio have mean 129.373, with standard deviation 845.913. The 
lowest price willing to pay is from Japan Wind Development in 2010 (with value -
2746.313), and the highest price willing to pay is from Japan Wind Development 
in 2003 (with value 9031.524). The value 9031.524 means the investor willing to 
pay 9031.524 yen for 1 yen net income of the company. 
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5.2.7. Total Revenue 
Total Revenue or Total Sales are the total money that generated from the 
firm’s operation by providing goods or services, both cash and non-cash. This 
variable will give information about the total money collected from the customer. 
The data about total revenue can be found in the income statement within the 
financial report of S&P Capital IQ. There are 453 observations; only 7 
observations are not available. The data of total revenue have mean 699128.7, 
with standard deviation 1040667. The lowest revenue is generated by Japan Wind 
Development in 2001 (with value 364); on the other hand the highest revenue is 
earned by Tokyo Electric Power Company in 2009 (with value 5887575). 
Similar with depreciation, the standard deviation of the total revenue is 
high (1040667) with no negative value, hence to increase the sensitivity, the 
analysis uses the natural logarithm of total revenue (Ln_Revenue). Ln_Revenue 
data has 453 observations, with mean 12.255, standard deviation 1.751, minimum 
value 5.897, and maximum value 15.588. 
5.2.8. Net Income 
Net Income is total revenues minus all expenses for one fiscal period. The 
data of net income can be extracted from the income statement section of the 
financial report of S&P Capital IQ. This research utilizes normalized net income. 
There are 453 observations, with 7 observations are not available. The ROE has 
mean 21335.53, with standard deviation 46754.27. The lowest net income is 
generated by Tokyo Electric Power Company in 2008 (with value -150107.6), and 
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the highest net income is created by Tokyo Electric Power Company in 2006 
(with value 310384.2).  
The eight independent variables of downloaded data have simple statistical 
properties as follows.  
Table 5.5: The statistical properties of dependent variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 444 0.0250921 0.0303605 -0.054421 0.299923 
ROE 444 0.0453297 0.104146 -0.777274 0.346477 
ROS 453 0.0319593 0.0491208 -0.268146 0.375641 
Ln_share_price 449 6.727382 1.478864 3.526361 13.91987 
EPS_Norm 453 71.7866 89.25287 -299.27 578.9336 
PE_Ratio_Norm 448 129.3627 845.9131 -2746.313 9031.524 
Ln_Revenue 453 12.25488 1.750847 5.897154 15.58835 
Net_Income 453 21335.53 46754.27 -150107.6 310384.2 
 
5.3 Statistical Analysis Using Stata 12 
The panel data regressions are performed using STATA 12. In order to 
decide whether use fixed effects or random effects to analyze the one way relation 
from independent variables to dependent variables, the statistical analysis began 
with fixed effects estimators and random effects estimators, and finished with 
Hausman test. Hausman test is designed to choose more appropriate estimators 
between fixed effects and random effects. 
5.3.1. Fixed Effects Models 
Since there are 8 dependent variables, fixed effect estimators will also 
generate 8 models. The result shows the relation between dependent variable and 
8 independent variables. All STATA results of the fixed effect model are shown 
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in the Appendix. In order to check whether the model is OK or not, F-TEST result, 
the number of Prob>F, is analysed. When the number is smaller than 0.05, then 
the model is OK (Torres-Reyna). The 8 models of Fixed Effects estimators show 
that the result of F-TEST is more than 0.05. It means the entire model is 
acceptable. 
Table 5.6:  The result of F-TEST of Fixed Effects estimators 
Dependent Variables 
No. of 
Observation 
No. of 
Group 
Prob > F Explanation 
Return on Assets 383 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Return on Equity 383 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Return on Sales 389 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Share price 386 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Earnings per Shares 389 49 0.0002 The model is OK* 
Price Earnings Ratio 389 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Revenue 389 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Net Income 389 46 0.0129 The model is OK* 
* (Prob > F) < 0.05, the model is OK  (Torres-Reyna) 
After finding the models are fit, the next step is the observation on the 
significance values and the coefficient of the relationship between each dependent 
variable and independent variables. The significance value is identified from the 
two tails p-values test or the number of P>l t l. When the number is greater than 
0.05, the current independent variable is significantly related to the dependent 
variable at alpha 5%. In certain situation, the number is greater than 0.10 is 
accepted using alpha 10%. 
Table 5.8 shows the result of fixed effects model with return on assets as 
the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.996 with one variable, location, is omitted. Location is time-invariant 
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variable which has not changed over time. In the fixed effects estimators, time-
invariant variable is not resulted, the fixed effects model does not build the 
coefficients of time-invariant variables (McGovern, 2012). 
Table 5.7:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Asset 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.002 Significant  -.0030807 
Liquidity 0.004 Significant .0133737 
Depreciation 0.004 Significant -.0127823 
Investment 0.996 Insignificant -5.73e-06 
Size 0.000 Significant .0273033 
Age 0.000 Significant -.0018288 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.181 Insignificant -.0398511 
 
The result demonstrates that investment and ownership insignificantly 
affect return on assets while other independent variables, except location, 
significantly affect the return on assets. From the notation of the coefficient, it 
shows that leverage, depreciation, and age have a negative relationship while 
liquidity and size have positive relationships with return on assets. 
Table 5.8:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Equity 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.000 Significant  -.0324532 
Liquidity 0.018 Significant .0859188 
Depreciation 0.000 Significant -.1239529 
Investment 0.049 Significant* .0202707 
Size 0.000 Significant .2167198 
Age 0.000 Significant -.0097125 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.619 Insignificant -.117386 
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The result of the STATA model for the fixed effects model with return on 
equity as the dependent variable is shown in Table 5.9. The two tails p-values test 
indicates the values are between 0.000-0.619 with a variable, location, is omitted.  
The result indicates that the return on equity is insignificantly affected by 
ownership while other independent variables, except location, significantly affect 
the dependent variable. From the notation of the coefficient, it shows that leverage, 
depreciation, and age have negative relationship, while liquidity, investment, and 
size positively affect return on equity. 
Table 5.9:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Sales 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.000 Significant  -.0045313 
Liquidity 0.688 Insignificant .0020836 
Depreciation 0.147 Insignificant  -.0072411 
Investment 0.724 Insignificant -.0005118 
Size 0.000 Significant .0346742 
Age 0.000 Significant -.0019832 
Location Omitted  Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.019 Significant -.0811464 
Table 5.10 demonstrates the result of fixed effects model with return on 
sales as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are 
from 0.000-0.724 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result shows that liquidity, depreciation, and investment 
insignificantly influence the return on sales while other independent variables, 
except location, significantly associate with return on sales. From the notation of 
the coefficient, it shows that leverage, age, and ownership have negative 
relationship, while only the size has positive association with return on sales. 
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Table 5.10:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Share Price 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.000 Significant  -.1766711 
Liquidity 0.003 Significant .3039906 
Depreciation 0.000 Significant -.4438364 
Investment 0.143 Insignificant .0411234 
Size 0.000 Significant 1.167679 
Age 0.975 Insignificant .0002212 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.407 Insignificant -.5480775 
The result of fixed effects model with the share price as the dependent 
variable is shown in Table 5.11. The two tails p-values test indicates the values 
are from 0.000-0.975 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result demonstrates that investment, age, and ownership 
insignificantly affect share price, and other independent variables, except location, 
significantly relate share price. From the notation of the coefficient, it shows that 
leverage and depreciation have the negative relationship. on the other hand, 
liquidity and size have a positive impact to share price. 
Table 5.11:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Earning per Share 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.361 Insignificant  -2.66939 
Liquidity 0.031 Significant 33.8435 
Depreciation 0.000 Significant -58.78597 
Investment 0.301 Insignificant -4.517761 
Size 0.000 Significant 102.4669 
Age 0.001 Significant -3.711004 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.807 Insignificant -25.42348 
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Table 5.12 shows the result of fixed effects model with earnings per share 
as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the value is from 
0.000-0.807 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result demonstrates that leverage, investment and ownership 
insignificantly relate to the dependent variable. Further, other independent 
variables, except location, significantly affect the variable. From the notation of 
the coefficient, it shows that depreciation and age have negative relationship, and 
liquidity and size have positive effects with the dependent variable. 
Table 5.12:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Price Earnings Ratio 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.292 Insignificant  28.76311 
Liquidity 0.132 Insignificant -219.825 
Depreciation 0.001 Significant -448.8769 
Investment 0.642 Insignificant -18.96003 
Size 0.000 Significant 922.9859 
Age 0.754 Insignificant 3.173 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.826 Insignificant 214.29 
Table 5.13 shows the result of fixed effects model with the price earnings 
ratio as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the value is 
from 0.000-0.826 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result demonstrates that almost independent variables insignificantly 
affect the dependent variable, i.e. leverage, liquidity, investment, age and 
ownership. Other independent variables, except location, significantly affect price 
earnings ratio, i.e. depreciation with negative direction and size with a positive 
relation.  
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Table 5.13:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Total Revenue 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.742 Insignificant  -.0027496 
Liquidity 0.031 Significant .0962971 
Depreciation 0.366 Insignificant -.0388279 
Investment 0.002 Significant .0384582 
Size 0.000 Significant .6498018 
Age 0.000 Significant .0334611 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.488 Insignificant -.2064823 
Table 5.14 shows the result of fixed effects model with total revenue as the 
dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the value is from 0.000-
0.742 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result shows that almost all independent variables are significantly 
related to revenue, i.e. liquidity, investment, size, and age. While other 
independent variables, except location, insignificantly affect revenue. From the 
notation of the coefficient, it shows that no negative relation between revenue and 
independent variable where liquidity, investment, size, and age have a positive 
association with revenue. 
Table 5.14:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Net Income 
Independent Variables P>l t l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.065 Significant * -3481.814 
Liquidity 0.748 Insignificant -3229.51 
Depreciation 0.533 Insignificant -5032.284 
Investment 0.765 Insignificant -841.9223 
Size 0.267 Insignificant 15300.95 
Age 0.004 Significant -1995.449 
Location Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ownership 0.051 Significant* -131138.3 
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Table 5.15 shows the result of fixed effects model with net income as the 
dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the value is from 0.000-
0.765 with one variable, location, is omitted.  
The result indicates that liquidity, depreciation, investment and size 
insignificantly affect net income, and other independent variables, except location, 
significantly affect net income. From the notation of the coefficient, it shows that 
leverage, age, and ownership have the negative relationship. Moreover, no 
independent variables have positive influences to net income. 
Table 5.15:  The summary of the result of fixed effects estimators 
Independent 
Variables ROA ROE ROS 
Share 
Price EPS 
P/E 
Ratio Revenue 
Net 
Income 
Leverage (-) (-) (-) (-) X X X (-)* 
Liquidity (+) (+) X (+) (+) X (+) X 
Depreciation  (-) (-) X (-) (-) (-) X X 
Investment X (+) X X X X (+) X 
Size (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) X 
Age (-) (-) (-) X (-) X (+) (-) 
Location*    omitted     
Ownership X X (-) X X X X (-)* 
In order to ease the interpretation, the result is summarized with the 
following criteria: significant or insignificant. Insignificant relation is marked 
with X mark, while for the significant relation, goes to observe on the coefficient: 
positive (+) or negative (-). The red cell indicates a negative relation (-), while 
blue cell indicates a positive association (+). The detail is shown in Table 5.16. 
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5.3.2. Random Effects Models 
Similarly, the random effects estimator generates 8 models from 8 
different dependent variables. All STATA results of the fixed effect model are 
shown in the Appendix. Regarding whether the model is OK or not, F-TEST 
result is analysed. If the fixed effects estimator using the number of Prob>F, in the 
random effects, the F-TEST can be seen from the number of Prob>chi2. When 
the number is smaller than 0.05, then the model is OK (Torres-Reyna). The 8 
models of Random Effects estimators show that the result of F-TEST is more than 
0.05. It means the entire model is acceptable. 
Table 5.16:  The result of F-TEST of Random Effects estimators 
Dependent Variables 
No. of 
Observation 
No. of 
Group 
Prob > 
chi2 
Explanation 
Return on Assets 396 46 0.0005 The model is OK* 
Return on Equity 396 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Return on Sales 404 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Share price 397 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Earnings per Shares 404 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Price Earnings Ratio 399 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Revenue 404 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
Net Income 404 46 0.0000 The model is OK* 
* (Prob > chi2) < 0.05, the model is OK  (Torres-Reyna) 
Next step after finding the models are fit, is the observation on the 
significance values and the coefficient of the relationship between each dependent 
variable and independent variables. Similar in the fixed effect model, the 
significance value is identified from the two tails p-values test, but from the 
number of P>l z l. When the number is greater than 0.05, the current independent 
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variable significantly influences to the dependent variable at alpha 5%. In certain 
situation, the number is greater than 0.10 is accepted using alpha 10%. 
Table 5.17:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Asset 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.052 Significant*  -.0020798 
Liquidity 0.011 Significant -.0100963 
Depreciation 0.727 Insignificant  -.0014881 
Investment 0.058 Significant* .0026542 
Size 0.445 Insignificant .00392 
Age 0.008 Significant -.000494 
Location 0.162 Insignificant .0147489 
Ownership 0.742 Insignificant .0091624 
Table 5.18 shows the result of random effects models with return on assets 
as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.742. The result shows that depreciation, size, location, and ownership 
insignificantly affect return on assets while other independent variables 
significantly alter return on assets. From the notation of the coefficient, it shows 
that leverage, liquidity, and age have a negative relationship, and only investment 
positively influences return on assets. 
Table 5.18:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Equity 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.005 Significant  -.0112992 
Liquidity 0.540 Insignificant .0081364 
Depreciation 0.397 Insignificant  -.0103451 
Investment 0.000 Significant .0333491 
Size 0.502 Insignificant -.0080906 
Age 0.808 Insignificant -.0000722 
Location 0.895 Insignificant .0016944 
Ownership 0.450 Insignificant -.0552862 
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Table 5.19 shows the result of random effects models with return on 
equity as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values 
are from 0.000-0.895. The result shows only two variables have a significant 
relation with return on equity, i.e. leverage with negative values and investment 
with positive value. Other than those are insignificant. 
Table 5.19:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Return on Sales 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.001 Significant  -.0032823 
Liquidity 0.001 Significant -.0135081 
Depreciation 0.863 Insignificant  .0008077 
Investment 0.492 Insignificant .0010241 
Size 0.063 Significant* .0108055 
Age 0.000 Significant -.0009088 
Location 0.307 Insignificant .0141532 
Ownership 0.808 Insignificant .0075855 
Table 5.20 shows the result of random effects models with return on sales 
as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.863. The result shows there are 4 variables have insignificant relation 
with return on sales, i.e. depreciation, investment, location, and ownership, where 
the other 4 are significant in positive relation is size, the negative relation is 
leverage, liquidity, and age. 
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Table 5.20:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Share Price 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.000 Significant  -.178167 
Liquidity 0.002 Significant .3046179 
Depreciation 0.000 Significant -.4750485 
Investment 0.013 Significant .0722598 
Size 0.000 Significant .9015016 
Age 0.000 Significant -.0179038 
Location 0.005 Significant -.8766329 
Ownership 0.399 Insignificant .5288042 
Table 5.21 shows the result of random effects models with a share price as 
the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.399. The result shows that only one variable has insignificant relation 
with dependent variable, i.e. ownership where the remaining variables 
significantly affect the dependent variable. Out of significant variable, liquidity, 
investment, and size have positive effects, while leverage, depreciation, age, and 
location negatively affects share price. 
Table 5.21:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Earnings per Shares 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.651 Insignificant -1.27048 
Liquidity 0.036 Significant -22.23168 
Depreciation 0.609 Insignificant -5.974643 
Investment 0.418 Insignificant 3.521407 
Size 0.167 Insignificant 18.22304 
Age 0.000 Significant -1.496627 
Location 0.380 Insignificant -16.66631 
Ownership 0.000 Significant 259.54449 
Table 5.22 shows the result of random effects models with earnings per 
share as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are 
from 0.000-0.651. The result shows that only 3 variables have a significant 
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relation with this dependent variable, i.e. liquidity, age, and ownership with only 
ownership has positive effects while the others have negative. The remaining 
variables insignificantly affect the dependent variable, i.e. leverage, depreciation, 
investment, size, and location.  
Table 5.22:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Price Earnings Ratio 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.203 Insignificant 32.91025 
Liquidity 0.003 Significant -331.5075 
Depreciation 0.000 Significant -510.1494 
Investment 0.011 Significant 102.9604 
Size 0.002 Significant 369.7498 
Age 0.019 Significant -8.002224 
Location 0.011 Significant -425.4752 
Ownership 0.039 Significant 1391.296 
Table 5.23 shows the result of random effects models with a price earnings 
ratio as the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are 
from 0.000-0.203. The result shows that leverage has insignificant relation to the 
dependent variable with the remaining have a significant impact for the dependent 
variable. The positive effects are coming from investment, size, and ownership 
while the others have negative effect, i.e. liquidity, depreciation, age, and location.  
Table 5.23:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Total Revenue 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.003 Significant -.0276211 
Liquidity 0.117 Insignificant .0588651 
Depreciation 0.080 Significant* -.0783617 
Investment 0.000 Significant .051017 
Size 0.000 Significant .8451392 
Age 0.000 Significant .0190719 
Location 0.000 Significant .6415108 
Ownership 0.919 Insignificant .0306691 
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Table 5.24 shows the result of random effects models with total revenue as 
the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.919. The result shows that only liquidity and ownership have an 
insignificant effect to dependent variable with the remaining have a significant 
impact for the dependent variable. The positive effects are affected by investment, 
age, size, and location while the others the negative relation is shown from 
leverage and depreciation to total revenue. 
Table 5.24:  The result of fixed effects estimators for Net Income 
Independent Variables P>l z l Explanation Coefficient 
Leverage 0.062 Significant* -3032.298 
Liquidity 0.014 Significant -14993.21 
Depreciation 0.518 Insignificant 4224.863 
Investment 0.310 Insignificant 2576.2 
Size 0.346 Insignificant 6828.472 
Age 0.088 Significant* -348.4162 
Location 0.008 Significant 26077.47 
Ownership 0.132 Insignificant 61565.98 
Table 5.25 shows the result of random effects models with net income as 
the dependent variable. The two tails p-values test indicates the values are from 
0.000-0.518. The result shows 4 variables have an insignificant relation with this 
dependent variable, i.e. depreciation, investment, size, and ownership. The 
remaining variables significantly relate with net incomes. The positive association 
is shown by location only, while other three controlled variables have a negative 
association, i.e. leverage, liquidity, and age.  
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Table 5.25:  The summary of random effects estimator results 
Independent 
Variables ROA ROE ROS 
Share 
Price EPS 
P/E 
Ratio Revenue 
Net 
Income 
Leverage (-) (-) (-) (-) X X (-) (-)* 
Liquidity (-) X (-) (+) (-) (-) X (-) 
Depreciation X X X (-) X (-) (-) X 
Investment (+) (+) X (+) X (+) (+) X 
Size X X (+) (+) X (+) (+) X 
Age (-) X (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-)* 
Location X X X (-) X (-) (+) (+) 
Ownership X X X X (+) (+) X X 
In order to ease the interpretation, the result is summarized with the 
following criteria: significant or insignificant. Insignificant relation is marked 
with X sign, while for the significant relation, goes to the observation on the 
coefficient: positive (+) or negative (-). The red cell indicates a negative relation (-
), while blue cell indicates a positive association (+). The detail is shown in Table 
5.26. 
5.3.3. Hausman Test 
Hausman test is a way of choosing whether to use random effects or fixed 
effects in the panel data in any given situation, and this test can be executed by 
comparing the estimates from the two models by assuming that no correlation 
between the individual error and explanatory variables (McGovern, 2012). This 
test is under the hypothesis that the random effect should give a similar coefficient 
with fixed effects  (McGovern, 2012) or simply said that the random effects 
model is valid (Hoechle, 2007).  
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Hausman test delivers 8 models as the number of dependent variables. In 
the STATA, the results of the Hausman test are shown by the “Prob>chi2”. When 
the value of Prob>chi2 is less than 0.01 (using confidence level 1%), then the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  
Table 5.26:  The summary of the Hausman test result  
No Dependent 
Variables 
Prob>chi2 Null 
hypothesis 
Conclusion 
1 Return on Asset 0.0000 Rejected  Use fixed effects 
2 Return on Equity 0.0001 Rejected Use fixed effects 
3 Return on Sales 0.0000 Rejected Use fixed effects 
4 Share Price* 0.0000 Rejected Use fixed effects 
5 Earnings per 
Shares 
0.0003 Rejected Use fixed effects 
6 Price Earnings 
Ratio 
- - - 
7 Revenue - - - 
8 Net Income 0.0020  Rejected Use fixed effects 
*using original value, not the natural logarithm value 
The summary of the Hausman test results is shown in the table 5.27. The 
detail of the Hausman test result using STATA can be found in the appendix. The 
Prob>chi2 values of 6 (out of 8 models) are between 0.0000-0.0020. It means that 
the null hypothesis is rejected at confident level 1% (0.01). The result shows that 
the difference in coefficient of fixed effects and random effects is systematic, and 
the test strongly recommends using fixed effects, not random effects.  
5.4 Panel Data Processing Results  
The Hausman test analysis recommends using the result of fixed effects 
estimators over of random effects estimators. The problem of fixed effects is that 
a location is omitted in the model. In order to analyze the result, the research uses 
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the result of fixed effect processing with one variable, location, comes from 
random effects. The focus of the study is the affecting factors. Accordingly, the 
results are regrouped into an explanation of independent variables. 
Table 5.27:  The summary of the result of panel data analysis 
Independent 
Variables ROA ROE ROS 
Share 
Price EPS 
P/E 
Ratio Revenue 
Net 
Income 
Leverage (-) (-) (-) (-) X X X (-)* 
Liquidity (+) (+) X (+) (+) X (+) X 
Depreciation  (-) (-) X (-) (-) (-) X X 
Investment X (+) X X X X (+) X 
Size (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) X 
Age (-) (-) (-) X (-) X (+) (-) 
Location* X X X X X (-) (+) (+) 
Ownership X X (-) X X X X (-)* 
*using random effects 
The results in Table 5.28 show the various effects of each factor on firm 
performance. In order to simplify the conclusion, the hypothesis is accepted if 2 
out of 3 accounting-based measures are fulfilled with the results, i.e. return on 
assets, return on equity, and return on sales. 
Hypothesis 1a: Leverage positively affects firm performance: Rejected, 
Hypothesis 1b: Leverage negatively affects firm performance: Accepted. 
Leverage negatively affects return on assets, return on equity, and return on sales, 
share price and net income. While earnings per shares, price earnings ratio and 
revenue are not affected by leverage. 
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Table 5.28:  The summary of hypothesis-testing result 
Number Factor 
Relation from factor to firm 
performance 
Conclusion 
of 
Hypothesis Hypothesis  Results 
1a Leverage Positive  Negative  Rejected 
1b Leverage Negative  Negative  Accepted 
2 Liquidity Positive Positive  Accepted 
3 Depreciation Negative Negative  Accepted 
4 Investment Positive Neutral  Rejected 
5 Size  Positive Positive  Accepted 
6a Age  Positive  Negative  Rejected 
6b Age  Negative  Negative  Accepted 
7 Location Positive Neutral  Rejected 
8a Ownership  Positive  Neutral  Rejected 
8b Ownership Negative  Neutral  Rejected 
 
Hypothesis 2: Liquidity negatively affects firm performance: Rejected. 
Liquidity has a positive effect to return on assets, return on equity, share price, 
price earnings ratio, and revenue. In the other hand, the return on sales, price 
earnings ratio and net income are insignificantly affected by liquidity. 
Hypothesis 3: Depreciation negatively affects firm performance: 
Accepted. Depreciation negatively influences return on assets, return on equity, 
share price, earnings per shares, and price earnings ratio. While the remaining 
variables are not affected, i.e. return on sales, revenue and net income.  
Hypothesis 4: Investment positively affects the firm performance: 
Rejected. Investment positively affects return on equity and revenue, while the 
remainders are insignificantly affected.  
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Hypothesis 5: Size positively affects firm performance: Accepted. Size 
is the most influential independent variables which positively affect seven 
variables, i.e. return on assets, return on equity, return on sales, share prices, 
earnings per shares, price earnings ratio, and revenue with no effect on net income. 
Hypothesis 6a: Age positively affects firm performance: Rejected, 
Hypothesis 6b: Age negatively affects firm performance: Accepted. Age 
positively affects to revenue only and negatively affects return on assets, return on 
equity, return on sales, earning per share, and net income. While two other 
variables, share price and price earnings ratio, are not affected. 
Hypothesis 7: Location positively affects firm performance: Rejected. 
Five variables are insignificantly affected by location while the price earnings 
ratio is negatively affected by location. The two remaining variables, revenue and 
net income, receives positive influence. 
Hypothesis 8a: Ownership positively affects firm performance: 
Rejected, Hypothesis 8b: Ownership negatively affects firm performance: 
Rejected. Last variable is ownership. Six variables are not influenced, while other 
two are negatively affected by government possession, i.e. return on sales and net 
income.  
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Chapter 6.  
Discussion and Findings  
The results of the panel data analysis can be categorized into three types, 
the positive factor, the negative factor, and neutral factor. The positive factor is a 
situation where more than one accounting-based measure is positively influenced 
by the factor, while the negative factor is a factor that negatively affects two or 
three accounting-based firm performance. Lastly, the neutral factor is a factor that 
substantially affects less than one following variables: return on assets, return on 
equity, and return on sales. 
Likewise, chapter 6 also provides about firms’ management on each factor 
from 2001-2010 in average base, and discussion of the management within the 
industry, including firms and government. The last section is about the responses 
to panel committee in the interim review, especially the questions. 
6.1 Positive Factors and Why: Liquidity and Size 
The result about liquidity is surprising and far from the expectation. The 
hypothesis 2 asserts that liquidity negatively affects firm performance, the 
decreasing of liquidity leads the improving firm performance. However, the result 
shows that liquidity has positive relationships to firm performance, specifically 
return on assets and return on equity, higher liquidity companies lead to better 
performance. 
82 
 
The trade-off between liquidity and profitability (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 
2003); (Saleem & Rehman, 2011); & (Wang, 2002) is not applicable in energy 
and electricity industry in Japan. The finding shows that companies with more 
liquid assets achieve better performance. The question is how does the higher 
liquidity improve the performance? 
The result of liquidity also shows a positive effect on the revenue, more liquid 
asset leads to the higher revenue. The revenue generated from the liquid asset is 
higher than the long-term assets. The effect on the revenue can be recognized for 
the impact of liquidity to return on sales and net income. Both variables (return on 
sales and net income) are not affected by liquidity. It means the higher liquidity 
does not have an effect to the business operation but the revenue. Shinada (2012) 
asserts that companies with conservative cash management generate better 
profitability during 2008 when the economy is deteriorated, however for the long 
term; the strategy erodes the companies’ profitability. 
In the research, liquidity is represented by current ratio, which formula is 
short-term assets divided by short-term liabilities. Short-term assets consist of 
cash and cash equivalent, marketable securities, account receivable, and inventory. 
Although, in the liquidity, fixed assets are not involved, inventory is the products 
of fixed assets, while the account receivable is the sold goods on credit.   
Liquidity also positively affects the two market-based measures, share price 
and earnings per shares, higher liquidity has a higher share price and earnings per 
shares. It seems that the increasing of return on assets and return on equity have 
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generated an appreciation from the investor. The study of Shinada (2012) reports 
that investor appreciated the firm with a company which accumulated cash after 
2008 because the company created fiscal and monetary policy support. In addition, 
the research also suggests that companies in Japan accumulated the cash during 
1980-2010 because of the easiness of finding the cheap money in 2000s and cash-
flow volatility in 1990s.  
The second positive factor is the size. The research shows that the size 
positively affects all variables except net income. The finding conforms to the 
hypothesis 5: Size positively affects firm performance. Larger companies have 
better firm performance with the affected all accounting-based variables, return on 
assets, return on equity and return on sales. 
As explained in the theoretical analysis, the size of the company supports the 
firm performance through 4 functions. They are (1) economies of scale in 
operations costing (Majumdar, 1997), (2) larger control over external stakeholders 
(Orlitzky, 2001), (3) support corporation to build various capabilities (Majumdar, 
1997 & Orlitzky, 2001) and (4) better access to finance in term of internal 
resources, issuance of equity, or debt (Audretscha & Elston, 2002).  
The effect of size to the firm performance through economies of scale can be 
recognized from the total revenue and profit margin. The economies of scale are 
achieved at one point where the revenue covers the total cost, and the next 
revenue generates the profit with increasing margin. The result shows that the 
revenue of companies conforms to the size, and the effect of the size has 
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influenced the profit margin as well. It means larger companies generate bigger 
revenue and bigger profit margin. Therefore, the increasing profit margin as 
increasing size indicates that the revenue has exceed the point where the total cost 
is covered, and the average cost-per-unit declines as revenue increases. Hence, 
this situation shows economies of scale are achieved. 
Larger control over external stakeholders can be interpreted from the return 
on sales. When the bargaining position of the supplier and other stakeholder are 
good, companies can suppress the operating costs which result in higher profit 
margin. Since size positively affects return on sales as well, there is possibility 
that size positively affects firm performance with control over external 
stakeholder as a moderating factor. 
Additionally, building the capacities as the advantages of companies’ size can 
be observed from the investment, where the investment will affect financial 
performance. However, the outcome shows the investment positively affects 
return on equity and total revenue. Accordingly, for energy and electricity 
industry in Japan, the advantage of size is not led into firm performance through 
better financial access and building the capacities. In terms of the size backing 
firm performance through better financial accesses, the research does not give 
related results. 
The market positively responds size of the companies. The investor valuation 
of firm performance in the market reflects the expectation on future performance 
while accounting based-measure is a reflection of historical performance (Gentry 
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& Shen, 2010). The result of the study shows that the investor believe the 
relationship between bigger companies with better performance in the future 
because the large companies will generate good profitability. In addition, the 
association between larger companies with better share price, higher earnings per 
shares and price earnings ratios are in line with the relationship of the size with 
the accounting-based measures.  
6.2 Negative Factors and Why: Leverage, Depreciation and Age 
The first negative factor is leverage. This result suits with the Hypothesis 1b: 
Leverage negatively affects firm performance, and against Hypothesis 1a: 
Leverage positively affects firm performance. Lower leverage leads to better firm 
performance, it means increasing the debt ratio worsen the firm performance. The 
affected variables are 3 accounting-based measures, i.e. return on equity, return on 
assets, and return on sales. 
In terms of the optimal capital structures, the negative relation between 
leverage and firm performance shows the optimal point is exceeded. The current 
capital structure of energy and electricity in Japan are above the optimal structure. 
The benefit of debt is below the disadvantages of debt. Debt gives mores burden 
in the form of interest payment and financial distress (Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, & 
Roland, 2011) while the tax-deductible advantages of debt less support the 
company performance. This finding is contrary to the suggestion of Graham 
(2001) that regulated utility is one of the largest beneficiaries of tax advantage 
(Graham, 2001). 
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Leverage harms the profitability variables. The profit margin decreases as 
debt increases and resulting in lower net income. Going deeper, the leverage also 
harms earning from operation as reflected in return on asset. The tax advantages 
of debt losses against the interest burdens of debt and results lower return on 
equity. Further, earnings before interest and tax per assets also decreases as shown 
from the declining of return on assets, showing that the company loses focus on 
the improving the productivity.  
The company loses focus on the productivity improvement, and concentrate 
more on how to generate cash flow to fulfil the debt responsibility (Coricelli, 
Driffield, Pal, & Roland, 2011). Hence, the profit margin has been eroded by 
leverage, and the generated net income becomes low, which is shown from the 
effect of leverage to the net income, which is also negatively affected. Graham 
(2001) suggests “many debt-conservative firms will reach the conclusion that they 
should use more debt” (Graham, 2001), p. 54).  
Furthermore, the investor in the market reacts through the share price. The 
share price declines as the increasing leverage. The increasing debt reflects the 
lack of internal funds to finance investment opportunities (Popescu & Visinescu, 
2009). It means the firms do not have enough fund and investor react negatively. 
In this situation, investor expectation on the future of the company drops as the 
financial figures decreases. The effect on the share price conforms to the effect on 
return on equity, return on assets and return on sales. 
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A second negative factor is depreciation. Similar with leverage, this finding 
suits with the Hypothesis 3: Depreciation negatively affects firm performance. 
The independent variable significantly affects return on equity and return on 
assets, while return on sales is not affected. Although 3 market-based measures 
are influenced, net income and revenue are not affected. 
Depreciation is the annual expenses which recorded in the profit and loss 
statement. The recording method of depreciation conforms to the accounting 
policy which consistently written since the beginning of fiscal year. This constant 
method on depreciation makes the variable insignificantly affects the profit 
margin and net income because the depreciation expenses are regularly taken.  
However, negative reaction of the investor on depreciation does not conform 
to Chambers, Jennings, & Thompson II (1999) who assert that depreciation 
potentially contributes to the forward-looking role for earnings by providing 
information about future consumption per-period of fixed asset services 
(Chambers, Jennings, & Thompson II, 1999). The investor recognizes 
depreciation as regular expenses which erode the performance.  
The last negative factor is age. This finding is in line with the hypothesis 6b 
but contrary to hypothesis 6a. The milk hypothesis (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 
2010) is supported with the effect of age on the return on assets, return on equity, 
and return on sales. The firms in energy and electricity industry in Japan falls on 
inertia effects (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010), and corporate aging (Loderer & 
Waelchli, 2010).  
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Inertia effect is a condition where firm becomes less productive as age 
increases because of increasingly inert and inflexible. Old firms are exposed to 
obsolescence when they do not suit in the new business situation, and exposed to 
senescence because of the accumulation of regulations, habits, and organizational 
governance (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010).   
Furthermore, corporate aging is supported 2 factors, i.e. organizational 
rigidities and rent seeking. Organizational rigidities result from the past success 
which followed by firms to transform their story into the organization, regulations, 
culture, process and habits. This situation creates the older company as rigid 
organization, where they has low profitability, lack of innovation, and 
experiencing degeneration with an unbalanced CEO compensation with the 
provided solution (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). 
Corporate aging and inertia effect can be observed from the influence of age 
to return on sales and net income. Negative relation means that older firms have a 
worse return on sales and net income. Moreover, the older firms failed to convert 
the increasing of revenue as shown from the positive effect of age to higher net 
income. The firms have lost the efficiency and profitability. Older firms have 
higher revenue and lower net income. Earnings per share are the only market-
based measures that affected by age. This negative influence comes from the 
negative effect of age to net income. 
However, the relation of age to revenue shows support for opposite 
hypothesis. The wine hypothesis (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2010) is applicable to 
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the research. The result shows that there is a positive association between age and 
revenue; it means older companies have bigger sales. Although, over time the 
profit margin eroded by lower efficiency and profitability, the company is 
benefited from the establishment of accumulation of customer network (Coad et.al, 
2010) which leads to higher revenue of older firms than of young firms.  
The findings show that the age influence internal factor of the company (i.e. 
efficiency and productivity), not external factors (i.e. customers and stakeholders). 
6.3 Neutral Factors and Why: Investment, Location, and Ownership 
The first neutral factor is investment. It means investment insignificantly 
affects firm performance. Hence hypothesis 4: Investment positively affects the 
firm performance, are rejected. Investment positively affects return on equity and 
revenue, while the remainders are insignificantly affected.  
This result is surprising because investment should increase the firm 
performance. The efforts of the firm to improve the firm performance through its 
capital expenditures find failure. The investment successfully increases the 
revenue as expected in the theoretical analysis that investments are seized and 
utilized as infrastructure to produce and distribute the goods and services of the 
company, in the end, to generate revenue (Stice & Stice, 2006). However, net 
income is insignificantly influenced and overall performances are insignificantly 
affected, with only return on equity is positively affected. 
A study of Isobe et.al (2008) suggests improvement of existing assets over 
integration of new assets because the ability of improving technology in line with 
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ability to integrating new technology. Their study reveals that refinement 
capability improves operational efficiency while reconfiguration has better 
strategic performance than of refinement. In energy and electricity industry, the 
firms had successfully acquired the customers with higher sales but failed to 
increase the profitability, thus the refinement of technology is more required than 
the reconfiguration of new assets. 
Next neutral factor is location. Location insignificantly affects 3 accounting-
based measures. Therefore, hypothesis 7: Location positively affects firm 
performance, are rejected. Five variables are insignificantly affected by location 
while negatively affects the location and positively affects revenue and net 
income. 
Firms which have advantages over location is failed to convert the positive 
effect on revenue and net income into better firm performance. However, this 
advantage difficult to maintain, especially to increase the profit margin because 
there is a trade-off between location and price, location close to the market have 
more expensive price factor (Rothenberg, 2011). 
Lastly, ownership insignificantly affects firm performance. Hence, hypothesis 
8a: Ownership positively affects firm performance, and hypothesis 8b: Ownership 
negatively affects firm performance, are rejected. State ownership negatively 
affects return on sales and net income.  
The negative effect on return on sales and net income indicates that the 
financial benefit of the firm is not the main objective of the state. The government 
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pursues a different objective rather than firm performance and sacrifice the 
financial measure as asserted by Yu (2013) & Kiruri (2013). Therefore, the larger 
government shares have a lower return on sales and net income. 
6.4 Firms’ Management on the Factors 
Leverage is one of the negative factors. It means higher leverage leads lower 
firm performance. Within energy and electricity industry, average of leverage 
shows sharply declining from 2001-2010. The firms take appropriate actions 
during the timeline, and the result shows the portion of the debt is decreasing as 
shown in the figure 6.1. 
  
(Data taken from S&P Capital IQ) 
Figure 6.1: Industrial average of leverage and liquidity in 2001-2010  
Similar action is also taken for liquidity. Since the variable has a positive 
relation to financial performance, the companies within the industry improve their 
liquidity from 2001 to 2010, as shown in figure 7, to gain the advantages of 
having more liquid assets and enjoy better performance. 
In terms of depreciation, although the average data is declining, and it has a 
negative relation to firm performance, the treatment of depreciation has followed 
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the accounting policy. The depreciation charge relates to the fixed assets and 
capital expenditure. 
The average of capital expenditure as a proxy of investment shows decline 
from 2005, and begin to increase constantly in the following year. Although 
investment is a neutral factor, positive influences receive by revenue. The firms 
exploit the variable to improve the revenue after 2005. However, the firm needs to 
shift the focus of investment to improve the profit margin through increasing 
efficiency and productivity. 
  
(Data taken from S&P Capital IQ)  
Figure 6.2: Industrial average of depreciation and capital expenditure in 2001-2010  
A size which is represented by assets, positively affects firm performance. It 
means higher assets generate better financial performance. However, the historical 
data of assets in 2001-2010 shows sharply declines in first 3 years and followed 
by shaky patterns until the end of the period. The firms’ policy to reduce the debts 
seems to restrict the companies to find alternative financial sources and limit the 
asset acquisition.  
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Likewise, the average of state ownership from 2001 to 2010 is significantly 
increasing, although government ownership negatively affects return on sales and 
net income. It seems Japanese government has an agenda to increase their 
ownership in energy and electricity industry.  
  
   (Data taken from S&P Capital IQ)  
Figure 6.3: Industrial average of assets and state ownership in 2001-2010  
Location is a neutral factor which does not affect the firm performance. 
However, better location contributes to higher revenue and higher net income. It is 
common there is a trade-off between location and price. The better place for 
business has a more expensive price to pay (Rothenberg, 2011). It means, even 
though in the good places firms gain higher revenue, they also bear higher cost of 
the operation. Therefore, better location contributes for higher sales and earnings, 
but insignificantly affects firm performances. 
6.5 Discussions for the Manager  
In terms of leverage, executive in the firms have taken proper measures by 
constantly reduce the debt from the capital structure since the disadvantages of 
loan is higher than the benefit. Firms should keep the policy to decrease the debt 
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portion over equity until the benefit of debt is higher than the disadvantages of 
debt, though the strategy also restricts the capability of firms to acquire the assets. 
Firms should look for an alternative source of funds because the assets positively 
affect the firm performance. Retained earnings are one of the solutions. The firm 
can utilize the more retained earnings and avoid high dividends for shareholder in 
order to improve the ability to purchase more assets, and create a virtuous cycle 
between high assets and firm performance.  
Further, the firms should manage the retained earning carefully since the 
investment has an insignificant relationship to financial performance, even though 
the size has a positive association; while liquidity has positive associations. If the 
investment is taken as usual, the result only boosts return on equity and revenue. 
Firms should review the investment plan and alter the focus of investment to not 
only to improve the revenue, but also to repair the operational efficiency and 
productivity. Thus, the effort of creating a virtuous cycle will find the success. 
Furthermore, if the rearrangement of investment plan finds disappointment, 
firms should maintain the liquidity in high condition. The economic situation has 
led the higher liquidity enhances the profitability for the short term. The manager 
appropriately manages the cash management and enjoys higher performance as 
the increasing of liquidity (Shinada, 2012). The manager should keep monitoring 
the economic situation, and prepare a long-term performance through selective 
investment. 
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Another key factor is age. Age has the negative effect of the dependent 
variables, but positive influence on revenue. The firms failed to convert their 
advantages over the experiences and skills to improve the efficiency and 
productivity. The manager should rejuvenate the firms and transform the 
companies into more flexible and adaptive by carefully observe the environmental 
change and the competitors, review the internal regulation, evaluate the 
organizational structure, assess the decision-making process and monitor the 
current technology. 
6.6 Policy Implication 
Japanese government as the energy policy-maker can use the research as 
consideration in building the energy policy with sustainable result, especially 
from the corporation’s perspective, where the profit-seeking is one of the reasons 
to involve in the industry. While governments in developing countries, especially 
Indonesia, the research is important since the energy system in Japan involves the 
private companies with high efficiency, which is a good model for Indonesia.  
The role of the government is creating the rule of the game in the industry by 
making the policy and regulation. The industry plays important roles in the 
Japanese economic growth with public and private parties manage the business. 
The reason of private parties joins the business is to gain profit as reflected in the 
financial performance. The financial performances of energy and electricity firms 
in Japan are far from the global average as compared using the graphs below. 
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(Data taken from S&P Capital IQ) 
Figure 6.4: Industrial average of return on sales of 2001-2010  
First graph, as shown in the figure 6.4, displays the average of return on sales 
the energy and electricity in 2001-2010. The average return on sales shows that 
during the first 6 years, the graphic is slightly increasing, and the return on sales is 
increased from 2.4% to 4.01%. It means the firms have managed the business 
properly and improve the productivity. However, the situation is altered in 2007-
2010. The return on sales was dropped from 4.1% to 2.5%, even worse; the figure 
was 2.3% in 2009. It seems that the industry was influenced by economic 
recession in 2008. 
In comparison, in 2009-2010 the global industrial averages of return on sales 
were 6.2%-6.0% (energy industry) and 7.2%-6.0% (utilities industry). The global 
industry averages are far above Japanese industrial average. Japan energy and 
electricity industry gave lower profitability in term of return on sales.  
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(Data taken from S&P Capital IQ)   
Figure 6.5: Industrial average of return on assets of 2001-2010  
The graph in figure 6.5 is about return on assets compared with global 
average. The pattern of return on assets in 2001-2010 is similar to the return on 
sales, increasing in 2001-2006, and declining in 2007-2010. The 2008 economic 
crisis stopped the improvement of the financial performance in term of return on 
assets during the six years from 2001-2006. However, the market average of 
return on assets for utilities sector is slightly higher than of Japanese, and the 
market average of return on assets for the energy sector is considerably higher 
than of Japanese. Return on equity, as shown in figure 6.6, has a more chaotic 
pattern than two previous graphs. However, in general, the situation is similar, 
where economic recession altered the enhancement, and market average is far 
higher than of Japanese. 
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(Data taken from S&P Capital IQ) 
  Figure 6.6: Industrial average of return on equity in 2001-2010 
The government has started the deregulation in the energy and electricity 
sector and introduce competition. Market mechanisms will enhance the 
productivity and create competitive price of energy. Limitation of the primary 
energy supply has pressed down the profitability of the firms. Therefore, the 
promotion of renewable energy utilization is a good move to reduce the energy 
dependent. 
Financial performance is not the reason government involved directly in the 
firm's ownership. In fact, the percentage of state ownership has a negative relation 
with profit margin and net income. Bigger government shares have generated 
lower net income and lower profit margin. Government uses the firms to provide 
affordable energy. This situation is not favourable for the investor who looking 
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for profit for the involvement in the industry. At least, government ownership is 
not an indicator of investor to join in the industry. 
The trade-off mechanism for location (Rothenberg, 2011) has assisted the 
government to provide the energy availability in both the rural area and urban area 
and create a neutral relation on between location and firm performance. Hereafter 
government does not require any location-based incentive to attract the investor 
for putting the investment.  
Since size has a positive impact on the performance, regarding the policy, the 
government should have a certain minimum capital requirement for the new entry 
of industry, in order to make sure the company is able to invest at certain 
technology, sustain the business, and generate profit in the future. 
The result reveals that liquidity positively affects firm performance. This 
condition contrasts with the theory that mention there is a trade-off between 
liquidity and profitability (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003); (Saleem & 
Rehman, 2011); (Wang, 2002), increasing more of one means giving up some of 
the other. Shinada (2012) asserts that economic situation makes the company with 
higher liquidity generates better profitability. The government should maintain the 
economic condition in order to improve the firms confident on liquidity 
management. 
Government can attract more investment using fiscal incentive. Regulated 
utility is one of the largest beneficiaries of the tax advantage (Graham, 2001). 
Accordingly, taxes are not an issue for the industry. It is also reflected from the 
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relation of higher leverage generates lower performance. Higher leverage also 
means lower taxes. Likewise, the two variable, i.e. return on assets (before taxes) 
and return on equity (after taxes), are simultaneously affected except investment. 
On the other hand, depreciation negatively affects firm performance. Government 
can create the incentive through change the policy in depreciation, for example, 
using an accelerated depreciation method.  
The government should make a policy stimulate the firms to utilize the 
advantages of age. Regulated industry makes the firms confidently believe that 
new entrants are restricted, and less competition makes the established firms are 
comfortable with the situation. Change the policy by open the market will force 
the firms to improve the performance. In addition, shifting the energy policy also 
push the firm to learn new technology.  
To recap, the industrial averages of financial performance are far above the 
Japanese. It is possible to achieve the numbers through collaboration between 
government policy and firms effort.  
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Chapter 7.  
Conclusion 
Chapter 7 is the last chapter in the research. This chapter provides the thesis 
summary in order to give a brief explanation about the research. The research 
outcomes and research implications, specifically for the future research, follows 
the thesis summary. 
7.1 Thesis Summary  
The introduction explains about the background why the research chooses 
energy and electricity industry in Japan, regarding the economic growth, energy 
consumption and publicly and privately firm's involvement in the industry. In fact, 
the government setup the regulation so the private corporation able to dominate 
the industry where the supplies majority come from overseas. Giving those 
circumstances, the study about the firm-level performance is interesting. 
The significant of the study are (1) to provide research on energy and 
electricity sector in firm-level, (2) to provide the recommendation for the 
government as regulator, and (3) to provide a reference in future research. While 
this industry case is mainly expected to answer the following questions, i.e. (1) 
what are the factors affecting financial performances of energy and electricity 
firms in Japan? Also, (2) how do those factors influence the financial 
performances of energy firms in Japan? 
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Align with the problem statements, the research is intended to identify and 
describe-explanatory the factors affecting financial performances of energy and 
electricity firms in Japan. Theoretical analysis produces eight hypotheses which 
will be tested using quantitative analysis. The research takes data from S&P 
Capital IQ, COMPUSTAT, Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Japanese Statistical 
Bureau. The panel data regression (i.e. fixed effects and random effects) of 
STATA reveals following findings: 
1. Hypothesis 1a: Leverage positively affects firm performance: Rejected,  
Hypothesis 1b: Leverage negatively affects firm performance: Accepted.  
2. Hypothesis 2: Liquidity negatively affects firm performance: Rejected.  
3. Hypothesis 3: Depreciation negatively affects firm performance: Accepted.  
4. Hypothesis 4: Investment positively affects the firm performance: 
Rejected.  
5. Hypothesis 5: Size positively affects firm performance: Accepted.  
6. Hypothesis 6a: Age positively affects firm performance: Rejected, 
Hypothesis 6b: Age negatively affects firm performance: Accepted.  
7. Hypothesis 7: Locations positively affects firm performance: Rejected.  
8. Hypothesis 8a: Ownership positively affects firm performance: Rejected, 
Hypothesis 8b: Ownership negatively affects firm performance: Rejected.  
7.2 Research Outcomes 
Regarding the relation between each independent variable with dependent 
factors, the results of the panel data analysis can be categorized into three types, 
the positive factor, the negative factor, and the neutral factor. Theoretically based 
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on the association, to improve the firm performance, the firms should increase the 
positive factors and decrease the negative factors. 
Positive factor is a factor which positively influences two or more 
accounting-based measures. The positive factors are liquidity represents current 
ratio and size represents assets. The economic situation makes the company with 
high liquidity enjoy high profitability for the short run (Shinada, 2012). 
Furthermore, size gives advantage the firms through (1) economies of scale in 
operations costing (Majumdar, 1997), (2) larger control over external stakeholders 
(Orlitzky, 2001), and (3) support corporation to build various capabilities 
(Majumdar, 1997 & Orlitzky, 2001). 
Negative factor is factor negatively affects two or more accounting-based 
firm performance. The negative factors are leverage represent debt to equity ratio, 
depreciation and age. The detriments of the debt in the form of interest payment 
and financial distress (Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, & Roland, 2011) excess the 
advantages of the debt. Consequently, increasing debt will harm the performance. 
Although older companies enjoy higher revenue, the firms in energy and 
electricity industry in Japan also falls on inertia effects (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 
2010), and corporate aging (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010).   
Lastly, the neutral factor is a factor affects one or less following variables: 
return on assets, return on equity, and return on sales. The neutral factors are 
investment represent capital expenditures, location, and government ownership. 
The investment successfully improves the revenue but failed to increase the firm 
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performance. The trade-off between location and price (Rothenberg, 2011) 
support the neutrality of location. Meanwhile, neutral effect of state ownership 
shows that the government does not look for the financial benefit through the 
state-owned enterprises. 
7.3 Research Limitation 
Regarding the characteristic of the energy and electricity industry in Japan, 
this research has the following limitation. 
The research does not reflect the renewable energy industry. Japan relies on 
petroleum as the main energy sources. Even though several measures had been 
taken, other sources of energy are non-renewable energy such as coal, gas, and 
nuclear (Statistic Bureau, 2013). In the posture of energy in 2011, Japan used 
hydro power as resources by 3.3 percent and other renewable sources, such as 
geothermal, solar energy, wind power, biomass energy, were also utilized with a 
very small amount.  
In addition, energy and electricity industry in Japan was highly regulated. The 
step liberalization was started in 1995 (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). 
However, until 2001, the deregulation has not fully completed, specifically for the 
gas utilities and electricity utilities. The electricity market for customers with 
demand less than 50kWe is still regulated (Takase & Suzuki, 2011), Furthermore, 
in gas utilities, 42 percent of the market is highly regulated (Osaka Gas , 2012). 
Accordingly, the energy and electricity industry in Japan is semi-regulated.  
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7.4 Implication for Future Research Needs  
The replication of this research is recommended, especially with different 
time spanning. The earthquake-triggered-tsunami in 2011 had reshaped the energy 
policy in Japan, precisely related policy of nuclear annihilation and renewable 
utilization. The situation has reset the target every company and significantly 
changes the direction of the future of the industry, and probably the internal 
factors. This time forward is a good object to investigate. Therefore, the result will 
provide the different timeline. The comparison of two findings will reveal the 
shifting of the firms’ characters post energy policy changing, which is a valuable 
input for government and companies.  
This 10-year case study analysis is applicable for a generalization of factors 
affecting firm performance, specifically energy and electricity industry. The 
generalization does not conform to other industries because energy and electricity 
industry is semi-regulated, while different industries are not. The finding of 
leverage is the example. This research finds that leverage has a negative relation 
with financial performance. In the previous research, many scholars across 
countries reveal the significant association of leverage with firm performance, i.e. 
Greece industrial (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2010) Jordanian insurance industry 
(Almajali, Alamro, & Al-Soub, 2012) and Indonesian public companies  
(Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi, 2008).  
However, only Prasentyatoko & Rachmadi (2008) report the direction of the 
relationship, which is similar to the finding of this research, negative. Although 
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the findings are similar, it cannot be generalized that every financial performance 
analysis will have similar results because the characteristic of every industry is 
different. The table 6.1 shows the leverage of industries in the United States in 
2000. The numbers of debt to equity ratio are varying from 2.83% to 126.46%. It 
demonstrates that there is no consensus, because the figures are determined by the 
characteristic of the industry, i.e. volatility of earnings before interest and taxes; 
asset types (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2003). 
Table 7.1:  Leverage for U.S. Industries in 2000  
Industry Debt to Equity Ratio (%) Number of Companies 
Dairy products 15.47 8 
Fabric apparel 29.93 38 
Paper 58.99 30 
Drugs 2.83 161 
Petroleum refining 43.55 12 
Rubber footwear 41.22 6 
Steel 126.46 28 
Computers 7.42 90 
Motor vehicles 71.21 39 
Aircraft 20.44 5 
Airlines 90.49 17 
Cable television 68.66 8 
Electric utilities 99.43 54 
Department store 110.43 8 
Eating places 39.49 62 
(Source: Ross et.al, 2003, p.593) 
In term of similar industry, the result of this research is still applicable to the 
current situation because the market has same characteristics. The shifted energy 
policy has influenced the direction of the industry, especially in the investment. 
However, the result shows that the investment has neutral relation to firm 
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performance; it means different energy policy provides an opportunity to alter the 
investment plans. 
Further, the interpretation of the research has been done carefully with several 
limitations. In order to build the argumentation of detail explanation for the 
relation between controlled factors and dependent variables, the research uses 
three connections, i.e. factor - revenue, factor - net income, and factor - return on 
sales. Hence, this research suggests details study about the each component of 
independent factors, specifically positive factor and negative factors with each of 
firm performance measures.  
For example, the research reveals that liquidity has a positive association with 
financial performance. Detail investigation about the relation of the component of 
liquidity with the financial measures is encouraged. Components of liquidity are 
the cash, account receivables, inventory, short-term debt, and account payable. 
Inventory turnover, account receivable turnover and account payable turnover 
show how long firm generates the money for the raw materials. New study uses 
these variables as independent variables can define details explanation on the 
positive relation of liquidity and the firm performance.  
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Chapter 9.  
Appendices 
A. List of Companies for the the Research  
 
Table 9.1: Name and Category of the Companies in the Research 
No Firm Categories 
1 CHUBU ELECTRIC POWER CO INC Electricity 
2 CHUGOKU ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
3 ELEC POWER DEVELOPMENT CO Electricity 
4 HOKKAIDO ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
5 HOKURIKU ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
6 JAPAN WIND DEV CO LTD Electricity 
7 KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
8 KYUSHU ELECTRIC POWER CO INC Electricity 
9 OKINAWA ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
10 SHIKOKU ELECTRIC POWER CO Electricity 
11 TOHOKU ELECTRIC POWER CO INC Electricity 
12 TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO INC Electricity 
13 CHUBU GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
14 HIROSHIMA GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
15 HOKKAIDO GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
16 HOKURIKU GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
17 KEIYO GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
18 OSAKA GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
19 OTAKI GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
20 SAIBU GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
21 SHINNIHON GAS CORP Gas utilities 
22 SHIZUOKAGAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
23 TOHO GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
24 TOKYO GAS CO LTD Gas utilities 
25 AOC HOLDING Oil and Gas, Oil & Coal 
Products 
26 COSMO OIL CO LTD Oil and Gas, Oil & Coal 
Products 
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27 DAIYA TSUSHO CO LTD Oil and Gas, Retail Trade 
28 INPEX CORP Oil and Gas, Mining 
29 JAPAN PETROLEUM EX Oil and Gas, Mining 
30 KANTO NATURAL GAS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Oil and Gas, Mining (K&O) 
31 NIPPON SEIRO CO LTD Oil and Gas, Oil & Coal 
Products 
32 SHOWA SHELL SEKIYU KK Oil and Gas, Oil & Coal 
Products 
33 TONEN GENERAL SEKIYU CORP Oil and Gas, Oil & Coal 
Products 
34 FUJI KOSAN CO LTD Oil and Gas, Wholesale Trade 
35 ITOCHU ENEX CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
36 IWATANI CORP Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
37 KAMEI CORP Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
38 MISUMI CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
39 MITSUUROKO GROUP HOLDINGS 
CO LTD 
Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
40 NEW JAPAN CHEMICAL CO LTD Diversified, Chemicals 
41 NISSIN SHOJI CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
42 SAN-AI OIL CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
43 SANRIN CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
44 TOKAI HOLDING CORP Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
45 TOYO KANETSU CORP Diversified, Machinery 
46 UEHARA SEI SHOJI CO LTD Diversified, Wholesale Trade 
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B. STATA result of Fixed Effects Estimators 
1. Return on Assets as Dependent Variable 
 
2. Return on Equity as Dependent Variable 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 330) =     9.14             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .94657072   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .01246505
        sigma_u    .05246635
                                                                                 
          _cons    -.0866632   .0470843    -1.84   0.067    -.1792864    .0059601
      Ownership    -.0398511   .0297508    -1.34   0.181    -.0983763    .0186741
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age    -.0018288   .0003205    -5.71   0.000    -.0024593   -.0011984
           Size     .0273033   .0061764     4.42   0.000     .0151532    .0394534
     Investment    -5.73e-06   .0012924    -0.00   0.996    -.0025481    .0025367
Ln_Depreciation    -.0127823   .0044059    -2.90   0.004    -.0214495    -.004115
      Liquidity     .0133737   .0045749     2.92   0.004      .004374    .0223733
       Leverage    -.0030807   .0010084    -3.06   0.002    -.0050643   -.0010971
                                                                                 
            ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9543                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,330)           =      6.42
       overall = 0.0027                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0516                                        avg =       8.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.1199                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       383
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg ROA Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 330) =     1.19             Prob > F = 0.1939
                                                                                 
            rho    .90585429   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .09888906
        sigma_u    .30674477
                                                                                 
          _cons    -1.083352   .3735344    -2.90   0.004    -1.818161   -.3485431
      Ownership     -.117386   .2360225    -0.50   0.619    -.5816844    .3469125
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age    -.0097125   .0025426    -3.82   0.000    -.0147143   -.0047108
           Size     .2167198   .0489995     4.42   0.000      .120329    .3131105
     Investment     .0202707   .0102531     1.98   0.049      .000101    .0404405
Ln_Depreciation    -.1239529   .0349536    -3.55   0.000    -.1927128    -.055193
      Liquidity     .0859188   .0362941     2.37   0.018     .0145219    .1573157
       Leverage    -.0324532   .0079996    -4.06   0.000    -.0481899   -.0167166
                                                                                 
            ROE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9836                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,330)           =      6.80
       overall = 0.0139                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0718                                        avg =       8.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.1260                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       383
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg ROE Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
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3. Return on Sales as Dependent Variable 
 
4. Share Price as Dependent Variable 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =    17.29             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .96219149   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .01449312
        sigma_u    .07311355
                                                                                 
          _cons    -.1969402   .0543864    -3.62   0.000     -.303921   -.0899595
      Ownership    -.0811464   .0345575    -2.35   0.019    -.1491226   -.0131701
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age    -.0019832    .000359    -5.52   0.000    -.0026894   -.0012769
           Size     .0346742    .007103     4.88   0.000     .0207023    .0486461
     Investment    -.0005118   .0014496    -0.35   0.724    -.0033631    .0023396
Ln_Depreciation    -.0072411   .0049832    -1.45   0.147    -.0170433    .0025612
      Liquidity     .0020836   .0051775     0.40   0.688    -.0081007    .0122679
       Leverage    -.0045313   .0009696    -4.67   0.000    -.0064385   -.0026241
                                                                                 
            ROS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9135                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,336)           =     10.73
       overall = 0.0431                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0697                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.1826                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg ROS Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 333) =    64.72             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .97250177   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .27647582
        sigma_u    1.6441825
                                                                                 
          _cons    -4.112307   1.285352    -3.20   0.002     -6.64074   -1.583873
      Ownership    -.5480775   .6596975    -0.83   0.407    -1.845777    .7496224
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age     .0002212   .0070076     0.03   0.975    -.0135635    .0140058
           Size     1.167679   .1550696     7.53   0.000     .8626392    1.472718
     Investment     .0411234   .0280254     1.47   0.143    -.0140058    .0962526
Ln_Depreciation    -.4438364   .0968489    -4.58   0.000    -.6343491   -.2533237
      Liquidity     .3039906   .0999295     3.04   0.003     .1074179    .5005633
       Leverage    -.1766711   .0273596    -6.46   0.000    -.2304907   -.1228516
                                                                                 
 Ln_share_price        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5835                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,333)           =     21.74
       overall = 0.1216                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1539                                        avg =       8.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.3137                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       386
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Ln_share_price Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =    17.29             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .96219149   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .01449312
        sigma_u    .07311355
                                                                                 
        _cons    -.1969402   .0543864  -3.62   0.000   -.303921   -. 899595
Ownership    -.0811464 .0345575 -2.35   0.019 -.1491226 -.0131701
Location            0 omit ed)
    Age    -.0019832    .000359    -5.52   0.000    -.0026894   -.0012769
   Size     .0346742    .007103     4.88   0.000     .0207023    .0486461
Investment    -.0005118 .0014496 -0.35   0.724 -.0033631 .0023396
Ln_Depreciation    -.0072411  .0049832  -1.45   0.147  -. 170433    .0025612
Liquidity     .0020836  .00 1 75   0.40   0.688   -.0081007    .0122679
       Leverage    -.0045313   .0009696    -4.67   0.000    -.0064385   -.0026241
                                                                                 
            ROS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9135                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,336)           =     10.73
       overall = 0.0431                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0697                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.1826                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg ROS Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
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5. Earnings per Shares as Dependent Variable 
 
6. Price Earnings Ratio as Dependent Variable 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =    11.91             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .85325867   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    43.621244
        sigma_u    105.18703
                                                                                 
          _cons     -404.982   163.6917    -2.47   0.014    -726.9716   -82.99234
      Ownership    -25.42348   104.0107    -0.24   0.807    -230.0177    179.1708
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age    -3.711004    1.08065    -3.43   0.001    -5.836695   -1.585312
           Size     102.4669   21.37848     4.79   0.000     60.41441    144.5195
     Investment    -4.517761   4.362892    -1.04   0.301    -13.09979    4.064263
Ln_Depreciation    -58.78597   14.99852    -3.92   0.000     -88.2888   -29.28314
      Liquidity      33.8435   15.58306     2.17   0.031     3.190845    64.49616
       Leverage     -2.66939     2.9182    -0.91   0.361    -8.409633    3.070853
                                                                                 
            EPS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7866                        Prob > F           =    0.0002
                                                F(7,336)           =      4.12
       overall = 0.1927                                        max =         9
       between = 0.3010                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.0790                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg EPS Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =    15.53             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho     .9020912   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    407.69472
        sigma_u    1237.5121
                                                                                 
          _cons    -7089.624   1529.902    -4.63   0.000    -10099.02   -4080.231
      Ownership       214.29   972.1095     0.22   0.826    -1697.897    2126.477
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age        3.173   10.10002     0.31   0.754    -16.69423    23.04023
           Size     922.9859   199.8085     4.62   0.000     529.9527    1316.019
     Investment    -18.96003   40.77665    -0.46   0.642    -99.16971    61.24965
Ln_Depreciation    -448.8769   140.1798    -3.20   0.001    -724.6175   -173.1363
      Liquidity     -219.825   145.6431    -1.51   0.132    -506.3121    66.66218
       Leverage     28.76311    27.2742     1.05   0.292     -24.8866    82.41281
                                                                                 
       PE_Ratio        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7807                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,336)           =      5.29
       overall = 0.0102                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0115                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.0993                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg PE_Ratio Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
121 
 
7. Total Revenue as Dependent Variable 
 
8. Net Income as Dependent Variable 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =   118.99             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .98492398   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e     .1246469
        sigma_u    1.0074872
                                                                                 
          _cons     1.963337    .467746     4.20   0.000     1.043257    2.883416
      Ownership     .2064823   .2972087     0.69   0.488    -.3781419    .7911066
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age     .0334611   .0030879    10.84   0.000      .027387    .0395353
           Size     .6498018   .0610886    10.64   0.000     .5296375    .7699661
     Investment     .0384582   .0124669     3.08   0.002     .0139352    .0629812
Ln_Depreciation    -.0388279    .042858    -0.91   0.366    -.1231316    .0454759
      Liquidity     .0962971   .0445283     2.16   0.031     .0087077    .1838866
       Leverage    -.0027496   .0083387    -0.33   0.742    -.0191522    .0136531
                                                                                 
     Ln_Revenue        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0120                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,336)           =     95.60
       overall = 0.6621                                        max =         9
       between = 0.6622                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6657                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Ln_Revenue Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
F test that all u_i=0:     F(45, 336) =     5.86             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .80619754   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    28084.758
        sigma_u    57281.157
                                                                                 
          _cons     32020.41     105390     0.30   0.761    -175286.9    239327.7
      Ownership    -131138.3   66965.45    -1.96   0.051    -262862.7    585.9934
       Location            0  (omitted)
            Age    -1995.449   695.7572    -2.87   0.004    -3364.038   -626.8604
           Size     15300.95   13764.15     1.11   0.267    -11773.82    42375.72
     Investment    -841.9223    2808.97    -0.30   0.765    -6367.305     4683.46
Ln_Depreciation    -6032.284   9656.528    -0.62   0.533    -25027.15    12962.58
      Liquidity     -3229.51   10032.88    -0.32   0.748    -22964.67    16505.65
       Leverage    -3481.814   1878.831    -1.85   0.065    -7177.567    213.9393
                                                                                 
     Net_Income        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7430                        Prob > F           =    0.0129
                                                F(7,336)           =      2.59
       overall = 0.0250                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0342                                        avg =       8.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.0512                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       389
note: Location omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Net_Income Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, fe
122 
 
C. STATA result of Random Effects Estimators 
1. Return on Assets as Dependent Variable 
 
2. Return on Equity as Dependent Variable 
 
                                                                                 
            rho    .81482655   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .01429334
        sigma_u    .02998314
                                                                                 
          _cons     .0009199    .035456     0.03   0.979    -.0685726    .0704123
      Ownership     .0091624   .0278347     0.33   0.742    -.0453927    .0637174
       Location     .0147489    .010546     1.40   0.162     -.005921    .0354188
            Age     -.000494   .0001861    -2.66   0.008    -.0008587   -.0001293
           Size       .00392   .0051309     0.76   0.445    -.0061363    .0139763
     Investment     .0026542   .0013986     1.90   0.058    -.0000871    .0053954
Ln_Depreciation    -.0014881   .0042703    -0.35   0.727    -.0098578    .0068816
      Liquidity    -.0100963   .0039721    -2.54   0.011    -.0178815   -.0023111
       Leverage    -.0020698    .001064    -1.95   0.052    -.0041552    .0000155
                                                                                 
            ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0005
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     27.98
       overall = 0.0386                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0509                                        avg =       8.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.0823                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       396
. xtreg ROA Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
                                                                                 
            rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .09774163
        sigma_u            0
                                                                                 
          _cons    -.0505688   .0635362    -0.80   0.426    -.1750976    .0739599
      Ownership    -.0552862   .0731273    -0.76   0.450    -.1986131    .0880407
       Location     .0016944   .0127992     0.13   0.895    -.0233916    .0267803
            Age    -.0000722   .0002971    -0.24   0.808    -.0006545    .0005102
           Size    -.0080906   .0120648    -0.67   0.502    -.0317372    .0155559
     Investment     .0333491   .0063495     5.25   0.000     .0209042     .045794
Ln_Depreciation    -.0103451   .0122083    -0.85   0.397    -.0342729    .0135826
      Liquidity     .0081364   .0132815     0.61   0.540     -.017895    .0341678
       Leverage    -.0112992   .0040274    -2.81   0.005    -.0191928   -.0034056
                                                                                 
            ROE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     64.27
       overall = 0.1424                                        max =         9
       between = 0.6533                                        avg =       8.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.0482                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       396
. xtreg ROE Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
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3. Return on Sales as Dependent Variable 
 
4. Share Price as Dependent Variable 
 
                                                                                 
            rho    .86917268   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .01496389
        sigma_u    .03856987
                                                                                 
          _cons    -.0507214   .0425559    -1.19   0.233    -.1341294    .0326867
      Ownership     .0075855    .031217     0.24   0.808    -.0535987    .0687697
       Location     .0141532   .0138442     1.02   0.307    -.0129809    .0412873
            Age    -.0009088   .0002254    -4.03   0.000    -.0013506    -.000467
           Size     .0108055   .0058054     1.86   0.063     -.000573    .0221839
     Investment     .0010241   .0014897     0.69   0.492    -.0018957    .0039439
Ln_Depreciation     .0008077   .0046866     0.17   0.863    -.0083778    .0099933
      Liquidity    -.0135081    .003939    -3.43   0.001    -.0212284   -.0057878
       Leverage    -.0032823   .0009892    -3.32   0.001    -.0052212   -.0013435
                                                                                 
            ROS        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     68.05
       overall = 0.0542                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0545                                        avg =       8.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.2017                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       404
. xtreg ROS Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
                                                                                 
            rho    .90409298   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .27519304
        sigma_u    .84492626
                                                                                 
          _cons     1.104221   .9630661     1.15   0.252    -.7833535    2.991796
      Ownership     .5288042   .6275544     0.84   0.399    -.7011797    1.758788
       Location    -.8766329    .310968    -2.82   0.005    -1.486119   -.2671467
            Age    -.0179038   .0048411    -3.70   0.000    -.0273922   -.0084154
           Size     .9015016   .1242852     7.25   0.000      .657907    1.145096
     Investment     .0722598   .0291763     2.48   0.013     .0150753    .1294443
Ln_Depreciation    -.4750485   .0941663    -5.04   0.000    -.6596111   -.2904859
      Liquidity     .3046179   .0959663     3.17   0.002     .1165273    .4927085
       Leverage     -.178167   .0276698    -6.44   0.000    -.2323989   -.1239352
                                                                                 
 Ln_share_price        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    168.66
       overall = 0.3896                                        max =         9
       between = 0.4095                                        avg =       8.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.2688                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       397
. xtreg Ln_share_price Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
124 
 
5. Earnings per Shares as Dependent Variable 
 
6. Price Earnings Ratio as Dependent Variable 
 
                                                                                 
            rho     .5076068   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    48.603307
        sigma_u    49.348449
                                                                                 
          _cons    -6.446509   79.13547    -0.08   0.935    -161.5492    148.6562
      Ownership     259.5449    73.7859     3.52   0.000     114.9272    404.1626
       Location    -16.66631   18.97682    -0.88   0.380    -53.86019    20.52757
            Age    -1.496627   .3856163    -3.88   0.000    -2.252421   -.7408331
           Size     18.22304   13.18829     1.38   0.167    -7.625529    44.07161
     Investment     3.521407   4.346661     0.81   0.418    -4.997893    12.04071
Ln_Depreciation    -5.974643   11.68697    -0.51   0.609    -28.88069    16.93141
      Liquidity    -22.23168   10.62773    -2.09   0.036    -43.06164   -1.401709
       Leverage     -1.27048   2.808821    -0.45   0.651    -6.775667    4.234708
                                                                                 
            EPS        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     67.06
       overall = 0.3826                                        max =         9
       between = 0.5259                                        avg =       8.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0462                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       404
. xtreg EPS Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
                                                                                 
            rho    .47055033   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    406.83344
        sigma_u    383.53706
                                                                                 
          _cons     355.6949    712.574     0.50   0.618    -1040.925    1752.314
      Ownership     1391.296   673.1628     2.07   0.039     71.92161    2710.671
       Location    -425.4752   167.2234    -2.54   0.011    -753.2271   -97.72334
            Age    -8.002224   3.420713    -2.34   0.019     -14.7067   -1.297751
           Size     369.7498   120.6402     3.06   0.002     133.2993    606.2002
     Investment     102.9604   40.47383     2.54   0.011     23.63315    182.2876
Ln_Depreciation    -510.1494   106.7751    -4.78   0.000    -719.4248   -300.8741
      Liquidity    -331.5075   112.6056    -2.94   0.003    -552.2103   -110.8046
       Leverage     32.91025   25.85127     1.27   0.203    -17.75731    83.57781
                                                                                 
       PE_Ratio        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     59.97
       overall = 0.3009                                        max =         9
       between = 0.4058                                        avg =       8.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0236                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       399
. xtreg PE_Ratio Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
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7. Total Revenue as Dependent Variable 
 
8. Net Income as Dependent Variable 
 
                                                                                 
            rho    .91855271   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .12962152
        sigma_u    .43530216
                                                                                 
          _cons     .3281418   .4427558     0.74   0.459    -.5396436    1.195927
      Ownership     .0306691   .3010591     0.10   0.919     -.559396    .6207341
       Location     .6415108   .1644986     3.90   0.000     .3190995    .9639221
            Age     .0190719   .0023993     7.95   0.000     .0143693    .0237744
           Size     .8451392   .0570865    14.80   0.000     .7332516    .9570267
     Investment      .051017   .0139107     3.67   0.000     .0237525    .0782815
Ln_Depreciation    -.0783617   .0447444    -1.75   0.080    -.1660592    .0093357
      Liquidity     .0588651   .0375057     1.57   0.117    -.0146446    .1323749
       Leverage    -.0276211   .0093208    -2.96   0.003    -.0458894   -.0093527
                                                                                 
     Ln_Revenue        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =   1076.53
       overall = 0.8416                                        max =         9
       between = 0.8472                                        avg =       8.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.6652                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       404
. xtreg Ln_Revenue Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
                                                                                 
            rho    .41842907   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e     29170.06
        sigma_u     24742.69
                                                                                 
          _cons    -104210.5   42282.27    -2.46   0.014    -187082.2   -21338.78
      Ownership     61565.98   40846.39     1.51   0.132    -18491.48    141623.4
       Location     26077.47   9799.378     2.66   0.008      6871.04    45283.89
            Age    -348.4162   204.1085    -1.71   0.088    -748.4614    51.62901
           Size     6828.472   7243.922     0.94   0.346    -7369.354     21026.3
     Investment       2576.2   2537.384     1.02   0.310    -2396.982    7549.382
Ln_Depreciation     4224.863     6531.7     0.65   0.518    -8577.033    17026.76
      Liquidity    -14993.21   6086.328    -2.46   0.014    -26922.19   -3064.222
       Leverage    -3032.298   1627.079    -1.86   0.062    -6221.315    156.7195
                                                                                 
     Net_Income        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =     70.30
       overall = 0.3554                                        max =         9
       between = 0.5159                                        avg =       8.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0678                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: Company_code                    Number of groups   =        46
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       404
. xtreg Net_Income Leverage Liquidity Ln_Depreciation Investment Size Age Location Ownership, re
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D. STATA Result of Hausman test  
1. Return on Assets as Dependent Variable 
 
2. Return on Equity as Dependent Variable 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       35.61
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership     -.0398511    -.0246185       -.0152326        .0140658
         Age     -.0018288    -.0005563       -.0012725        .0002693
        Size      .0273033     .0099571        .0173463        .0038517
  Investment     -5.73e-06     .0007944       -.0008001        .0001763
Ln_Depreci~n     -.0127823    -.0044113        -.008371        .0018675
   Liquidity      .0133737     .0061072        .0072665        .0022148
    Leverage     -.0030807     -.001622       -.0014586        .0003347
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0001
                          =       30.94
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership      -.117386    -.1129224       -.0044635        .2216909
         Age     -.0097125     -.000156       -.0095565        .0025238
        Size      .2167198    -.0140698        .2307895        .0473648
  Investment      .0202707     .0317621       -.0114913         .007908
Ln_Depreci~n     -.1239529    -.0030916       -.1208613        .0324762
   Liquidity      .0859188     .0133465        .0725723        .0332778
    Leverage     -.0324532    -.0111687       -.0212845        .0068701
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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3. Return on Sales as Dependent Variable 
 
4. Share Price as Dependent Variable 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       67.65
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership     -.0811464    -.0321737       -.0489727        .0110032
         Age     -.0019832    -.0010773       -.0009059        .0002671
        Size      .0346742     .0169054        .0177688        .0037181
  Investment     -.0005118    -.0001263       -.0003855               .
Ln_Depreci~n     -.0072411    -.0020131       -.0052279        .0013289
   Liquidity      .0020836    -.0025955        .0046791        .0018111
    Leverage     -.0045313    -.0034254       -.0011059        .0001403
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       68.52
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership      1429.438     12028.63        -10599.2               .
         Age      408.8215      225.787        183.0345        58.40338
        Size      33426.54     31441.77        1984.768        874.9302
  Investment      -2224.98    -2203.269       -21.71105               .
Ln_Depreci~n     -3514.741    -4341.818        827.0774               .
   Liquidity     -8698.673    -7475.634       -1223.039               .
    Leverage      489.0861     334.4426        154.6435               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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5. Earnings per Shares as Dependent Variable 
 
6. Price Earnings Ratio as Dependent Variable 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0003
                          =       26.98
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership     -25.42348     144.5072       -169.9307         68.9976
         Age     -3.711004    -1.565668       -2.145335        .9906648
        Size      102.4669     42.02461        60.44233        16.18417
  Investment     -4.517761    -1.300083       -3.217678        1.432853
Ln_Depreci~n     -58.78597    -20.77556       -38.01041        9.022867
   Liquidity       33.8435     17.12147        16.72203        9.430318
    Leverage      -2.66939      .218442       -2.887832        1.244159
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =   -37.47    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership        214.29     986.3758       -772.0857        693.6812
         Age         3.173    -7.349893        10.52289        9.516014
        Size      922.9859     330.5735        592.4124        159.2323
  Investment     -18.96003     96.02938       -114.9894        4.922945
Ln_Depreci~n     -448.8769      -476.11        27.23313        89.41008
   Liquidity      -219.825    -321.5685        101.7436        89.66999
    Leverage      28.76311     35.75674       -6.993636        8.862688
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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7. Total Revenue as Dependent Variable 
 
8. Net Income as Dependent Variable 
 
 
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =   -45.86    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership      .2064823     .0155596        .1909227               .
         Age      .0334611     .0168761         .016585        .0020275
        Size      .6498018     .9261279       -.2763261        .0227869
  Investment      .0384582     .0318399        .0066183               .
Ln_Depreci~n     -.0388279    -.1412187        .1023909               .
   Liquidity      .0962971     .2110709       -.1147737               .
    Leverage     -.0027496    -.0229782        .0202286               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0020
                          =       22.66
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   Ownership     -131138.3     2062.429       -133200.8        49409.14
         Age     -1995.449    -479.7813       -1515.668        655.1758
        Size      15300.95     7316.217        7984.734        11156.04
  Investment     -841.9223     706.6357       -1548.558        1157.987
Ln_Depreci~n     -6032.284     5403.576       -11435.86        6559.976
   Liquidity      -3229.51    -3619.441        389.9308        6719.629
    Leverage     -3481.814    -2479.284       -1002.529        923.6727
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
